

GOV2761: International Organization Fall 2021

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Tuesday 9:45-11:45
CGIS K401

Office hours: Thursday 1:30-3pm

Appointment sign-up <https://tinyurl.com/Davis-OfficeHours>

You may come for virtual or in person office hour during this time, but must have appointment scheduled by noon that day. Email my assistant Ashleigh Maciolek (amaciolek@fas.harvard.edu) if you would like an appointment outside office hours or have problems locating readings.

Course description

The number and scope of international organizations continues to expand so that there are few areas of international politics that are not regulated in some way by an international institution, whether informal norms or a formal organization. Why do states establish institutions and what determines their design and evolution? Do these institutions merely reflect underlying power and interests? These are some of the questions we will be asking in this course. It is an advanced research seminar that will introduce theories of international institutions, evaluate critical perspectives, and examine applications in security, economic, and environmental policy areas.

Course requirements

- 1) Participation in seminar discussion (for absences, you may substitute with extra review paper). 20 percent
- 2) For two weeks in the course, you are expected to write a 1-2 page review of an article selected from among the assigned readings, due by noon monday prior to seminar discussion of the article and circulated to class. Late papers are not accepted. These papers should discuss the theoretical contribution of the article to the literature, assess its empirical strategy and quality of evidence, and offer specific suggestions for how the article could be improved. The exercise models how one would write a referee report for a journal when asked to review a manuscript. 20 percent (each paper constitutes 10 percent of course grade)
- 3) For one week, you will provide ten-minute presentation of an "IGO case" that reviews how the IGO operates with background on its creation, design, and effectiveness. You should bring to class copies of one-page outline but not use audiovisual. What scholarly puzzle could be examined through further analysis of the case? Use IGO website and MIA dataset as starting point, connect to at least two scholarly articles either from among assigned readings or other academic article/book and include full reference citation on your outline. 10 percent
- 4) Choice of two 8-10 page papers on themes from a weekly topic with one written during first half of semester due October 12th and one during second half of semester by December 8th; or a 20-30 page research paper due by December 8th (those who choose the latter option should discuss their topic with me and submit a 1 page proposal by no later than the third week of class Sept 21st). 50 percent

Books recommended for purchase:

Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

Gray, Julia. *The Company State's Keep* (Cambridge University Press, 2013)

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Koremenos, Barbara. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Cornell University Press, 2009).

Week 1 Introduction

Krasner, Stephen. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” and “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables” in *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 1-22, 355-368. (also available through JSTOR as *International Organization* 36, no. 2 Spring 1982)

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984), chps. 1, 4-6 (pp. 5-17, 49-109) (Chapter 6 required, others recommended).

Hooghe, Liesbet with Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan (2017) *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III* (Oxford University Press). Chapter 1 “International Authority: From Concept to Measure” pp. 8-40.

Week 2 Theories on the Design of International Institutions

Drezner, Daniel. “A Typology of Global Governance Processes,” Chapter 3 in *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 63-88.

Koremenos, Barbara. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Part 1 pp. 1-99 (skim chapter on data sample).

Carnegie, Allison and Austin Carson . “The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations” *The American Journal of Political Science* (2019)
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12426>

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 1-50, 74-102.

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) Introduction.

Review:

Martin, Lisa. "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," *International Organization* 46, 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 765-792.

Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." Chapter 1 in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 3-38.

Ruggie, John. "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982).

Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), 5-49.

Morrow, James. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information," *International Organization* 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 387-423.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 761-99

Week 3 International Organizations as Clubs and Networks

Abbott et al, "Orchestration: Global Governance Through Intermediaries," Chapter 1 in *International Organizations as Orchestrators* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 3-38.

Downs, George W., David M. Roake and Peter N. Barsoom. "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, 52:2 (April 1998), 397-419.

Johnston, Alastair Iain, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 487-515

Davis, Christina and Meredith Wilf. "Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO" *Journal of Politics* 79, 3 (2017) Pp. 964-978.

Greenhill, Brian and Yonatan Lupu. "Clubs of Clubs: Fragmentation in the Network of Intergovernmental Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2017) pp. 181-195.

Gray, Julia. "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations" *International Studies Quarterly* 62, 1 (2018) pp. 1-13.

Recommended:

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The Real New World Order" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1997), pp. 183-197.

Kydd, Andy, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," *International Organization* 55, 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 801-828.

Week 4 Theories of Compliance

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50, 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406.

Dai, Xinyuan. "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes," *World Politics* 54 (July 2002): 405-436.

Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Chapter 1, 6-7.

Johns, Leslie. *Strengthening International Courts: The Hidden Costs of Legalization* (Michigan University Press, 2015), pp. 1-123.

Sikkink, Kathryn. *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics* (W. W. Norton and Company, 2011) *Chapters 1, 4, and 5. pp. 1-28 and 96-161.*

Recommended:

Alter, Karen. *The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights* (Princeton University Press, 2014) Chapter 4 "World History and the Evolving International Judiciary," pp. 112-160.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47, 2, (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205.

Ostrom, Elinor and James Walker and Roy Gardner "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 404-407.

Keohane, Robert, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational" in Legalization and World Politics special issue, *International Organization* 54 no. 3 (2000): 457-488.

Fearon, James. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 269-305

Findley, Michael G., et al. "Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation." *International Organization*, vol. 67, no. 4, 2013, pp. 657–693. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/43282083.

Linos, Katerina, How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and Comparative Politics (December 30, 2015). 109 *American Journal of International Law* 475 (2015) , Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786606>

Week 5 Issue Linkage and Regime Complexity

Davis, Christina. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 153-169.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. "Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries' temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?" *The Review of International Organizations* 13 (2018): 491-518. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9>

Pratt, Tyler. "Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes", *International Organization*, Volume 72 Issue 3, Summer 2018, pp. 561-590

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 134-185 (recommended: 186-221).

Lipsy, Phillip. *Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2017) Introduction and Chapter 3 "The IMF and the World Bank" pp. 1-22, 63-90 (recommend also reading the country studies: pp. 91-119, 246-265).

Recommended:

The Politics of International Regime Complexity Symposium, *Perspectives on Politics* (2009). Selections by Alter and Meunier and Drezner.

Raustiala, Kal, and David Victor. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004):277-309.

Aggarwal, Vinod K. "Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting," Chapter one in *Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages and Nesting*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) pp. 1-31.

Poast, Paul, 2012. "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945." *International Organization* 66: 277—310.

Week 6 The Nexus Between Domestic and International Institutions

Allee, Todd and Paul Huth. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings and Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review*, 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 219-234.

Chaudoin, Stephen. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions." *International Organization* 68 (Winter 2014): 235-56

Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Chapters 2-3.

Phelan, William. *In Place of Inter-State Retaliation: The European Union's Rejection of WTO-style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies*. (Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 1-27, 94-151.

Mansfield, Edward and Jon Pevehouse. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 137-167.

Poast, Paul and Urpelainen, Johannes. 2015. "How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting consolidation?" *World Politics*, 67 no. 1: 72-113.

Recommended:

Pevehouse, Jon. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 515-549.

Keohane, Robert and Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, *International Organization*, vol. 63, Winter 2009, pp. 1-31.

Gartzke, Erik, and Megumi Naoi, 2011. "Multilateralism and Democracy: A Dissent Regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik" *International Organization* 65: 589-598.

Dai, Xinyuan. "The Power of Weak International Institutions," "Conclusion" Chapters 5 and 6 in *International Institutions and National Policies* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 100-151.

Week 7 Collective Security and the UN

Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Cornell University Press, 2009) pp. 1-85, 163-203.

Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C., Reifler, J. and Feaver, P. D. (2011), "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 55: 563-583.

Fang, Songying, 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 304-321.

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. "Genocide and the Peacekeeping Culture at the UN," in *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2004) pp. 121-155.

Fortna, Page. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. (Princeton University Press, 2008). Pp. 18-46, 76-126.

Campbell, Susanna. *Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Introduction pp. 1-35 and chapter 4 (pp. 142-200).

** Hooghe, Liesbet with Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan (2017) *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III* (Oxford University Press). Read United Nations case as background.

Recommended:

Wallander, Celeste and Robert O. Keohane. "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions." In Haftendorn, Helga, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space*. Oxford University Press 1999, pp.21--47.

Lo, Nigel, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, 2008. "Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914—2001." *International Organization* 62: 717—736.

Hultman, L., Kathman, J. and Shannon, M. (2013), United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57: 875–891.

Week 8 Monetary Policy and International Financial Institutions

Stone, Randall W., 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62: 589—620.

Caraway, Teri L., Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner, 2012. "International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality." *International Organization* 66: 27—61.

Lipscy, Phillip and Lee, Haillie. (2019). "The IMF as a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises" *International Organization* 73 (1). 73 (1), 35-64.

Drezner, Daniel. "Club Standards and International Finance," Chapter 5 in *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp.119-148.

Chan, Zenobia, and Sophie Meunier. "Behind the screen: Understanding national support for a foreign investment screening mechanism in the European Union." *The Review of International Organizations* (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-021-09436-y>

Gray, Julia. *The Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 1-15, 85-123.

Recommended:

Wilf, Meredith. 2016. "Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns" *International Organization*, 70(4): 763--796.

Mosley, Layna. 2010. "Regulating Globally, Implementing Locally: The Financial Codes and Standards Effort." *Review of International Political Economy*.

Helleiner, Eric, and Stefano Pagliari, 2011. "The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda." *International Organization* 65: 169—200.

Bach, David, and Abraham L. Newman, 2010. "Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation." *International Organization* 64: 505—528.

Simmons, Beth. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs" *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 819-835. Also recommended: critique article by Jana von Stein and response published in APSR 99, no. 4 (2005): pp. 611-631.

Thacker, Strom Cronan. "The High Politics of IMF Lending" *World Politics* 52, no. 1, (October 1999): 38-75.

Findley et al "Orchestrating the fight against anonymous incorporation: a field experiment" Chapter 12 in *International Organizations as Orchestrators* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

McNamara, Kathleen. "Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in European Monetary Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37 (September 1999).

Week 9 International Trade

Allee, Todd L., and Jamie E. Scalera, 2012. "The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession." *International Organization* 66: 243—276.

Carnegie, Allison. 2014. "States Held Hostage: Political Hold Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review*. 108(1): 54-70.

Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Ch 4-5, 8.

Maggi, Giovanni and Robert Staiger, "The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol 126, no. 1 (2011): pp. 475-515.

Pelc, Krzysztof. (2014) 'The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application', *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), pp. 547–564.

In Song Kim, Helen V Milner, Thomas Bernauer, Iain Osgood, Gabriele Spilker, Dustin Tingley, Firms and Global Value Chains: Identifying Firms' Multidimensional Trade Preferences, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2019, Pages 153–167, <https://doi-org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1093/isq/sqy055>

Recommended:

John Barton, Judith Goldstein, Tim Josling, and Richard Steinberg. *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO*. Princeton University Press, 2006.

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. (MIT Press, Cambridge 2002). Ch 1-2.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2, no. 1 (1990): 1--23.

Rose, Andrew. "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?" *American Economic Review* 94, no. 1 (2004): 98--114.

Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Mike Tomz. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade," *International Organization* 61, no. 1 (2007): 37-67.

Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of GATT 1950-94," *World Politics* 57, no. 4 (2005): 453-478.

Week 10 Cooperation to Protect the Environment

Keohane, Robert O. "The Global Politics of Climate Change: Challenge for Political Science," PS January 2015, pp. 19-26.

Keohane, Robert O. and David Victor. "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 no. 1 (2011): 7-23.

Green, Jessica. *Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance* (Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 26-53; 104-131.

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 103-133.

Charles Roger, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova, "The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance," *International Interactions* Vol 43, 1 (2017).

Recommended:

Haas, Peter M. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization* 43, no. 3. (Summer 1989): 377--403.

Cao, Xun, and Assem Prakash, 2012. "Trade Competition and Environmental Regulations: Domestic Political Constraints and Issue Visibility." *Journal of Politics* 74: 66--82.

Barrett, Scott. *Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making* (Oxford University Press, 2006) chapters 1, 2, 11, and 15.

Mitchell, Ronald. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." In *International Institutions*, pp. 103-136.

DeSombre, Elizabeth R. *Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry Environmentalists, and U.S. Power*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000. pp. 1--17, 171--191.

Nielson, Daniel and Michael Tierney. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization* 57 no. 2 (Spring 2003): 241-276.

Keohane, Robert O. and David G. Victor, "Cooperation and Discord in Global Climate Policy," *Nature Climate Change*, 9 May 2016.

Week 11 Human Rights Treaties and the International Criminal Court

Kelley, Judith. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements." *American Political Science Review*, 101, no. 3 (2007): 573-589.

Goodliffe, Jay, and Darren Hawkins, 2009. "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations." *Journal of Politics* 71: 977—997.

Doyle, Michael. 2016. "The Politics of Global Humanitarianism: R2P before and after Libya." In: *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds.). Oxford University Press: 673-691.

Jo, Hyeran and Beth Simmons. 2016. "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?" *International Organization* 70(3): 443-475.

Lupu, Yonatan. "Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements." *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), pp. 469-503.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. *Making Human Rights a Reality* (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 1-17.

Recommended:

Simmons, Beth. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Hathaway, Oona. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (2002): 1935-2041.

Vreeland, James. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention against Torture." *International Organization* Vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 65-101.

Morrow, James. "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (August 2007): 559-572.

Week 12 Global Health

Moon et al. (2015), "Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic." *The Lancet* vol. 386 no 10009, pp. 2204 – 2221.

Theodore M. Brown and Susan Ladwig, "COVID-19, China, the World Health Organization, and the Limits of International Health Diplomacy," *The American Journal of Public Health*, August 2020.

Fazal, Tanisha (2020). Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times. *International Organization*, 74(S1), E78-E97.

Drezner, Dan (2020). "The Song Remains the Same: International Relations After Covid-19," *International Organization* 74 (S1), pp. 18-35.

Barnett, Michael. (2020). COVID-19 and the Sacrificial International Order. *International Organization*, 74(S1), E128-E147.

Timon Forster & Mirko Heinzl (2021) "Reacting, fast and slow: how world leaders shaped government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:8, 1299-1320, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1942157

Hayakawa, Kazunobu, and Imai, Kohei. (2021). "Who sends me face masks? Evidence for the impacts of COVID-19 on international trade in medical goods." *The World Economy*, 00, 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13179>

Recommended:

Garrett, Laurie. "Ebola's Lessons: How the WHO Mishandled the Crisis". *Foreign Affairs*. 94 (5) Sept/Oct 2015: 80-107.

Cooper, Richard. "International Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation," in Cooper et al editors *Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation* (Brookings Institutions 1989) pp.178-254.