

GOV2761: International Organization Fall 2023

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Thursday 3:00 pm -5:00 pm
CGIS K401

Office hours: Thursday 10am -12pm

Appointment sign-up: <https://tinyurl.com/ChristinaDavisOfficeHours>

You may come for [virtual](#) or in-person office hour. Email my assistant Max Calleo (mcalleo@wcfia.harvard.edu) if you would like an appointment outside office hours or have problems locating readings.

Course description

The number and scope of international organizations continues to expand so that there are few areas of international politics that are not regulated in some way by an international institution, whether informal norms or a formal organization. Why do states establish institutions and what determines their design and evolution? Do these institutions merely reflect underlying power and interests? These are some of the questions we will be asking in this course. It is an advanced research seminar that will introduce theories of international institutions, evaluate critical perspectives, and examine applications in security, economic, and environmental policy areas.

Course requirements

- 1) Participation in seminar discussion (for 1 absence, you may substitute with extra review paper submitted by end of term). 20 percent
- 2) For two weeks in the course, you are expected to write a 1-2 page review of an article selected from among the assigned readings, due by noon Wednesday prior to seminar by email to me and uploaded to discussions section of Canvas site. Late papers are not accepted. These papers should discuss the theoretical contribution of the article to the literature, assess its empirical strategy and quality of evidence, and offer specific suggestions for how the article could be improved. The exercise models how one would write a referee report for a journal when asked to review a manuscript. 20 percent (each paper constitutes 10 percent of course grade)
- 3) For one week, ten-minute presentation (two students may collaborate). 10 percent

There are two options:

- a) an “IGO case” that reviews how an IGO mentioned in the weekly readings operates with background on its creation, design, and effectiveness. You should prepare audiovisual presentation with no more than 5 slides. What scholarly puzzle could be examined through further analysis of the case? Use the IGO website and MIA dataset as starting point, connect to at least two scholarly articles either from among assigned readings or other academic article/book and include reference citations at end.
 - b) Replication study that examines one of the assigned articles for the week with a critique of how revision of data analysis would support or amend the conclusions. You should prepare audiovisual presentation with no more than five slides (1-2 for summary of article and 2-3 for your analysis and comparison).
- 4) Choice of two 8-10 page papers on themes from a weekly topic with one written during first half of semester due October 12th and one during second half of semester by December 8th; or a 20-30 page research paper due by December 8th (submit a 1 page topic proposal by Sept 21st). Use consistent reference style (I recommend Chicago Manual author-date style). 50 percent

Books recommended for purchase:

Davis, Christina. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023).

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments Are Losing control Over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023).

Course Policies:

Collaboration Policy

All written work should be your own writing and ideas with proper citation to source material as necessary. You are encouraged to discuss the assignment and exchange draft papers for peer comments so long as the final submission is independent.

Certain assignments in this course will permit the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) tools such as ChatGPT. The default is that such use is disallowed unless otherwise stated. Any such use must be appropriately acknowledged and cited. It is each student's responsibility to assess the validity and applicability of any GAI output that is submitted; you bear the final responsibility. Violations of this policy will be considered academic misconduct. We draw your attention to the fact that different classes at Harvard could implement different AI policies, and it is the student's responsibility to conform to expectations for each course.

Late policy for papers:

There will be a one-third grade penalty assessed for each day past the deadline. Extensions will only be granted in the case of prior permission due to extenuating circumstances, or after the fact when in the case of medical or family emergency.

Guide to reading assignments:

Every week there are around 6 selections as a reading assignment. The two or three starred entries should be given priority for careful reading so that you would be ready to discuss the core logic of the argument and assess the research design and analysis. You should skim other selections (and some note extra pages of the selection that are recommended but not required). The recommended readings are for those who wish to delve deeper into a topic, but will not be a focus of seminar discussion.

Week 1 Introduction: September 7, 2023

*Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984), chps. 1, 4-6 (pp. 5-17, 49-109) (Chapter 6 required, others recommended).

*Davis, Christina. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), Chapter 1 pp 1-36.

Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), Chapter 1 pp. 1-26.

Recommended:

Hooghe, Liesbet with Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan (2017) *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III* (Oxford University Press). Chapter 1 “International Authority: From Concept to Measure” pp. 8-40. The MIA dataset is a valuable source of information on major IGO design.

Krasner, Stephen. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” and “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables” in *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 1-22, 355-368. (also available through JSTOR as *International Organization* 36, no. 2 Spring 1982)

Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions” *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), 5-49.

Week 2 Theories on the Design of International Institutions: September 14, 2023

Davis, Christina. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), Chapter 2 pp 37-70.

*Drezner, Daniel. "A Typology of Global Governance Processes," Chapter 3 in *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 63-88.

*Carnegie, Allison and Austin Carson . "The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations" *The American Journal of Political Science* (2019) pp. 269-285.

*Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 1-50, (recommended pp. 74-185).

Koremenos, Barbara. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Part 1 pp. 1-99 (skim chapter 3 on data sample).

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) Introduction. Pp 1-8.

Recommended:

Berman, Ayelet, Tim Buthe, Martino Maggetti, and Joost Pauwelyn, "Introduction: Rethinking Stakeholder Participation in Global Governance," pp. 1-30 in Pauwelyn et al editors, *Rethinking Participation in Global Governance* (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." Chapter 1 in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 3-38.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 761-99.

Martin, Lisa. "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," *International Organization* 46, 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 765-792.

Morrow, James. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information," *International Organization* 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 387-423.

Ruggie, John. "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982).

Week 3 International Organizations as Clubs: September 21, 2023

Colgan, Jeff D. (2014). The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market. *International Organization*, 68(3), 599-632.

*Davis, Christina. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), Chapter 9, pp 382-398, and select one of the empirical chapters 3-8 to read.

*Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, 52:2 (April 1998), 397-419.

Gray, Julia. "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations" *International Studies Quarterly* 62, 1 (2018) pp. 1-13.

*Johnston, Alastair Iain, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 487-515

Recommended:

Abbott et al, "Orchestration: Global Governance Through Intermediaries," Chapter 1 in *International Organizations as Orchestrators* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 3-38.

Dreher, Axel and James Vreeland. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) Chapter 1 pp. 1-34.

Greenhill, Brian and Yonatan Lupu. "Clubs of Clubs: Fragmentation in the Network of Intergovernmental Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2017) pp. 181–195.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The Real New World Order" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1997), pp. 183-197.

Kydd, Andy, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," *International Organization* 55, 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 801-828.

Voeten, Erik. *Ideology and International Institutions* (Princeton University Press, 2021) Chapter 1-2 pp. 1-40.

Week 4 Theories of Compliance: September 28, 2023

*Downs, Roque, and Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50, 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406.

Dai, Xinyuan. "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes," *World Politics* 54 (July 2002): 405-436.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and J.C. Sharman. *Vigilantes Beyond Borders: NGOs as Enforcers of International Law* (Princeton University Press, 2022), Chapter 1 pp 13-46.

*Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Chapter 1, skim chapters 6-7.

Johns, Leslie. *Strengthening International Courts: The Hidden Costs of Legalization* (Michigan University Press, 2015), pp. 1-12, (recommended pp 13-123).

*Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), Chapter 2 pp. 27-59, (recommended pp 60-98).

Recommended:

Alter, Karen. *The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights* (Princeton University Press, 2014) Chapter 4 "World History and the Evolving International Judiciary," pp. 112-160.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47, 2, (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205.

Fearon, James. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 269-305

Keohane, Robert, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational" in Legalization and World Politics special issue, *International Organization* 54 no. 3 (2000): 457-488.

Ostrom, Elinor and James Walker and Roy Gardner "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 404-407.

Phelan, William. *In Place of Inter-State Retaliation: The European Union's Rejection of WTO-style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies*. (Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 1-27, 94-151.

Week 5 Issue Linkage and Regime Complexity: October 5, 2023

*Clark, Richard. (2021). Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition Among International Organizations. *International Organization*, 75(4), 1133-1153.

Davis, Christina. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 153-169.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. "Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries' temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?" *The Review of International Organizations* 13 (2018): 491–518.

Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), chapter 4 pp 99-166.

Lipsky, Phillip. *Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2017) Introduction and Chapter 3 "The IMF and the World Bank" pp. 1-22, 63-90 (recommend also reading the country studies: pp. 91-119, 246-265).

*Pratt, Tyler. "Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes," *International Organization*, Volume 72 Issue 3, Summer 2018, pp. 561-590

Recommended:

The Politics of International Regime Complexity Symposium, *Perspectives on Politics* (2009). Selections by Alter and Meunier and Drezner.

Raustiala, Kal, and David Victor. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004):277-309.

Aggarwal, Vinod K. "Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting," Chapter one in *Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages and Nesting*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) pp. 1-31.

Poast, Paul, 2012. "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945." *International Organization* 66: 277—310.

Week 6 The Nexus Between Domestic and International Institutions: October 11, 2023*

Note the rescheduled time for Wednesday class meeting.

*Chaudoin, Stephen. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions." *International Organization* 68 (Winter 2014): 235–56

*Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Chapters 2-3.

Dellmuth, Lisa and Jan Aart Scholte, Jonas Tallberg, and Soetkin Verhaegen (2022). "The Elite-Citizen Gap in International Organization Legitimacy" *American Political Science Review*, 116 (1) pp. 283-300.

*Morse, Julia C. and Tyler Pratt. (2022). "Strategies of Contestation: International Law, Domestic Audiences, and Image Management" *The Journal of Politics* 84:4, 2080-2093.

Powell, Emilia Justyna and Krista Wiegand. *The Peaceful Resolution of Territorial and Maritime Disputes* (Oxford University Press, 2023) pp. 1-18, 208-240.

Wrátil, Christopher, Jens Wackerle, and Sven-Oliver Proksch. "Government Rhetoric and the Representation of Public Opinion in International Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 3 (2023): 1105–22.

Recommended:

Allee, Todd and Paul Huth. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings and Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review*, 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 219-234.

Dingwerth, K., Schmidtke, H., & Weise, T. (2020). The rise of democratic legitimization: why international organizations speak the language of democracy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(3), 714–741.

Kreps, S. E., & Wallace, G. P. (2016). International law, military effectiveness, and public support for drone strikes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(6), 830–844.

Mansfield, Edward and Jon Pevehouse. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 137-167.

Pevehouse, Jon. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 515-549.

Poast, Paul and Urpelainen, Johannes. 2015. "How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting consolidation?" *World Politics*, 67 no. 1: 72-113.

Keohane, Robert and Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism," *International Organization*, vol. 63, Winter 2009, pp. 1–31.

Gartzke, Erik, and Megumi Naoi, 2011. "Multilateralism and Democracy: A Dissent Regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik" *International Organization* 65: 589—598.

Week 7 Collective Security and the UN: October 19, 2023

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. "Genocide and the Peacekeeping Culture at the UN," in *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2004) pp. 121-155.

*Binder, Martin and Monika Heupel. 2015. The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 59, Issue 2, Pages 238–250,

Campbell, Susanna. *Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Introduction pp. 1-35 and chapter 4 (pp. 142-200).

Fortna, Page. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. (Princeton University Press, 2008). Pp. 18-46, 76-126.

*Thompson, Alexander. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Cornell University Press, 2009) pp. 1-85, 163-203.

Recommended:

Hooghe, Liesbet with Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan (2017) *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III* (Oxford University Press). Pp. 788-809. Read United Nations case as background.

Dreher, Axel and James Vreeland. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) Chapter 7 pp. 220-242.

Fang, Songying, 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 304—321.

Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C., Reifler, J. and Feaver, P. D. (2011), "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 55: 563–583.

Lo, Nigel, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, 2008. "Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914—2001." *International Organization* 62: 717—736.

Hultman, L., Kathman, J. and Shannon, M. (2013), United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57: 875–891.

Wallander, Celeste and Robert O. Keohane. "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions." In Haftendorn, Helga, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space*. Oxford University Press 1999, pp.21–47.

Week 8 International Financial Institutions: October 26, 2023

*Carnegie, Allison and Richard Clark, "Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance," *World Politics* 75, no. 3 (July 2023): 523-565.

Clark, Richard. and Dolan, L.R. (2021), Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65: 36-51.

Caraway, Teri L., Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner, 2012. "International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality." *International Organization* 66: 27—61.

Lipsey, Phillip and Lee, Haillie. (2019). "The IMF as a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises" *International Organization* 73 (1). 73 (1), 35-64.

*Gray, Julia. *The Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 1-15, 85-123.

Chan, Zenobia, and Sophie Meunier. "Behind the screen: Understanding national support for a foreign investment screening mechanism in the European Union." *The Review of International Organizations* (2021).

Recommended:

Bach, David, and Abraham L. Newman, 2010. "Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation." *International Organization* 64: 505—528.

Drezner, Daniel. "Club Standards and International Finance," Chapter 5 in *All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes* (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 119-148.

Mosley, Layna. 2010. "Regulating Globally, Implementing Locally: The Financial Codes and Standards Effort." *Review of International Political Economy*.

Simmons, Beth. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs" *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 819-835. Also recommended: critique article by Jana von Stein and response published in *APSR* 99, no. 4 (2005): pp. 611-631.

Stone, Randall W., 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62: 589—620.

Wilf, Meredith. 2016. "Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns" *International Organization*, 70(4): 763--796.

Week 9 International Trade: November 2, 2023

Carnegie, Allison. 2014. "States Held Hostage: Political Hold Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review*. 108(1): 54-70.

*Cha, Victor. 2023. "Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence." *International Security*, 48 (1), pp. 91-124.

*Davis, Christina. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton University Press, 2012): Ch 4-5, 8.

Davis, Christina. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), Chapter 4, pp 92-122.

*Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Mike Tomz. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade," *International Organization* 61, no. 1 (2007): 37-67.

Kim, In Song and Helen V Milner, Thomas Bernauer, Iain Osgood, Gabriele Spilker, and Dustin Tingley, Firms and Global Value Chains: Identifying Firms' Multidimensional Trade Preferences, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2019, Pages 153–167.

Pelc, Krzysztof. (2014) 'The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application', *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), pp. 547–564.

Recommended:

Allee, Todd L., and Jamie E. Scalera, 2012. "The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession." *International Organization* 66: 243—276.

Maggi, Giovanni and Robert Staiger, "The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol 126, no. 1 (2011): pp. 475-515.

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. (MIT Press, Cambridge 2002). Ch 1-2.

Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of GATT 1950-94," *World Politics* 57, no. 4 (2005): 453-478.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2, no. 1 (1990): 1--23.

Rose, Andrew. "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?" *American Economic Review* 94, no. 1 (2004): 98–114.

Week 10 Cooperation to Protect the Environment: November 9, 2023

*Colgan, Jeffrey, and Jessica Green, Thomas Hale. (2021). Asset Revaluation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change. *International Organization*, 75(2), 586-610.

*Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and J.C. Sharman. *Vigilantes Beyond Borders: NGOs as Enforcers of International Law* (Princeton University Press, 2022), Chapter 3 pp 84-123.

Johnson, Tana. *Organizational Progeny: Why governments are losing control over the proliferating structures of global governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 103-133.

*Keohane, Robert O. and David Victor. "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 no. 1 (2011): 7-23.

Mukherji, Rahul, and Himanshu Jha, 'India and Bangladesh in Global Finance Governance: From Structural Conflict to Embedded Liberalism in the Climate Finance Regime', in Joost Pauwelyn and others (eds), *Rethinking Participation in Global Governance: Voice and Influence after Stakeholder Reforms in Global Finance and Health* (Oxford, 2022).

Recommended:

Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), chapter 4 pp 99-166.

Charles Roger, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova, "The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance," *International Interactions* Vol 43, 1 (2017).

Cao, Xun, and Assem Prakash, 2012. "Trade Competition and Environmental Regulations: Domestic Political Constraints and Issue Visibility." *Journal of Politics* 74: 66—82.

DeSombre, Elizabeth R. *Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry Environmentalists, and U.S. Power*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000. pp. 1-17, 171-191.

Green, Jessica. *Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance* (Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 26-53; 104-131.

Barrett, Scott. *Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making* (Oxford University Press, 2006) chapters 1, 2, 11, and 15.

Haas, Peter M. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization* 43, no. 3. (Summer 1989): 377--403.

Mitchell, Ronald. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." In *International Institutions*, pp. 103-136.

Nielson, Daniel and Michael Tierney. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization* 57 no. 2 (Spring 2003): 241-276.

Week 11 Human Rights Treaties and the International Criminal Court: November 16, 2023

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. *Making Human Rights a Reality* (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 1-17.

*Kelley, Judith. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements." *American Political Science Review*, 101, no. 3 (2007): 573-589.

Hillebrecht, Courtney, and Scott Straus. "Who pursues the perpetrators?: State cooperation with the ICC." *Human Rights Quarterly*. 39 (2017): 162.

Jo, Hyeran and Beth Simmons. 2016. "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?" *International Organization* 70(3): 443-475.

Lupu, Yonatan. "Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements." *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), pp. 469-503.

*Sikkink, Kathryn. *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics* (W. W. Norton and Company, 2011) *Chapters 1 pp. 1-28 (recommend chapter 4 and 5 pp. 96-161).*

Recommended:

Doyle, Michael. 2016. "The Politics of Global Humanitarianism: R2P before and after Libya." In: *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds.). Oxford University Press: 673-691.

Hathaway, Oona. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (2002): 1935-2041.

Morrow, James. "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (August 2007): 559-572.

Goodliffe, Jay, and Darren Hawkins, 2009. "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations." *Journal of Politics* 71: 977—997.

Simmons, Beth. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Vreeland, James. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention against Torture." *International Organization* Vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 65-101.

Week 12 Global Health: November 30, 2023

*Berman, Ayelet, and Joost Pauwelyn, 'Assessing Stakeholder Participation Reforms in Global Health Governance', in Joost Pauwelyn and others (eds), *Rethinking Participation in Global Governance: Voice and Influence after Stakeholder Reforms in Global Finance and Health* (Oxford, 2022).

Brown, Theodore M. and Susan Ladwig, "COVID-19, China, the World Health Organization, and the Limits of International Health Diplomacy," *The American Journal of Public Health*, August 2020.

Drezner, Dan (2020). "The Song Remains the Same: International Relations After Covid-19," *International Organization* 74 (S1), pp. 18-35.

*Fazal, Tanisha (2020). Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times. *International Organization*, 74(S1), E78-E97.

Lall, Ranjit. *Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 2023) chapter 5, pp. 167-236.

*Worsnop, Catherine et al, The Unintended Consequences of Information Provision: The World Health Organization and Border Restrictions during COVID-19, *International Studies Perspectives*, Volume 24, Issue 1, February 2023, Pages 39–66.

Wong, Wendy H. and Eileen A. Wong (2020) What COVID-19 revealed about health, human rights, and the WHO, *Journal of Human Rights*, 19:5, 568-581.

Recommended:

Gopakumar, K M, 'The World Health Organization's Engagement with Non-State Actors: The Risk of Corporate Influence', in Joost Pauwelyn and others (eds), *Rethinking Participation in Global Governance: Voice and Influence after Stakeholder Reforms in Global Finance and Health* (Oxford, 2022).

Barnett, Michael. (2020). COVID-19 and the Sacrificial International Order. *International Organization*, 74(S1), E128-E147.

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