The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions *

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Abstract

The link between security politics and international economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? Existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, overlooking other channels of influence. In a study of multilateral economic organizations, we demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs during the accession process as states share benefits with favored partners while excluding others. This biased selection of members allows states to politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing membership patterns for 252 economic organizations from 1948 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for about *half* of the membership decisions in economic institutions.

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1 Introduction

Like social clubs, international organizations sort states into groups. During the formation and enlargement of international organizations, admission depends on specific attributes relevant to the regulated issue as well as broader relations among states. *Geopolitical discrimination* occurs when states selectively allow friends who share their foreign policy interests to enter international organizations. This paper measures the timing and weight allocated to geopolitics in the membership choices for multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that geopolitical discrimination has been a prevalent practice across a broad swathe of economic organizations for over sixty years. In this role, shared security interests form a foundation for economic cooperation.

We are not the first to study the interaction between states' economic and security interests (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Mansfield and Pollins, 2003; Lake, 2009). During the Cold War states allocated aid according to the military importance of recipients, and new strategic needs shape development policies today (e.g. Meernik et al., 1998; Boutton and Carter, 2014; Bermeo, 2018). Like aid, trade flows tend to follow the flag (e.g. Pollins, 1989; Keshk et al., 2004; Pandya, 2016). The income gains from trade spill over into military power, motivating states to trade with allies (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997). We add to this literature by highlighting another important mechanism by which states link security and economic interests: the politicization of institutional membership. Our analysis demonstrates that security linkages extend beyond bilateral exchanges of trade and aid, that they are not limited to the Cold War period, and that they have shaped the foundation and evolution of global governance.

The use of geopolitical discrimination during the accession phase, when states join multilateral institutions, resolves a dilemma for states. On the one hand, the principle of non-discrimination and practice of collective decision-making render multilateral institutions inefficient as tools of economic statecraft. It is much easier for states to manipulate bilateral aid and trade policies where national governments wield control. On the other hand, multilateral institutions govern a large amount of economic activity, and states have incentives to exploit these gains for geopolitical advantage. Discrimination during accession allows states to steer benefits under the guise of multilateralism. Through this practice, powerful states build their geopolitical coalitions and weaker states minimize the reforms needed to gain entry.

Our theory of geopolitical discrimination implies a different pattern of membership than existing arguments. Functional theories emphasize the ability of institutions to overcome market failures that hinder cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984; Farrell and Newman, 2015; Koremenos, 2016). States select cooperation partners based on expected compliance and efficiency gains from policy coordination within a given issue area. In contrast, when states prioritize geopolitical alignment, they may include weak compliers and exclude potential contributors. For example, Turkey was admitted to the OECD in 1961 despite its limited ability to contribute to economic coordination. More recently, Japan has resisted joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank while maintaining a strong commitment to development aid in East Asia. These are puzzling cases from a functional perspective until they are placed in geopolitical context. The question is whether they are rare exceptions or common practice.

In order to examine when and how geopolitics shapes economic cooperation, we analyze membership patterns in 252 multilateral economic organizations. We develop a relational measure of geopolitical alignment based on alliance ties and UN voting similarity between potential members and other states in the organization. Trade flows between new states and other members serve as a proxy for the functional theory that economic interdependence explains demand for institutionalized cooperation on economic issues. We find that measures of geopolitical alignment are strongly predictive of membership even when controlling for trade ties. Our evidence reveals that geopolitical discrimination during the accession process occurs during both the formation and enlargement stages.

Since geopolitical alignment and economic interdependence both drive membership, we use a finite mixture model to estimate the relative weight accorded to security ties versus trade ties. This model specification allows us to estimate *how much* states care about security ties when making membership decisions, while recognizing that economic interests also play an important role. We find that geopolitical alignment motivates nearly half of the membership decisions in our sample of 252 multilateral economic organizations over the period 1949-2014. Far from being the exception, security ties are a prominent factor that shapes who joins and remains in multilateral economic organizations. These results suggest that existing studies about political favoritism within multilateral institutions may understate the role of geopolitics (e.g. Thacker, 1999; Stone, 2008; Dreher et al., 2013). Even before the odds can be stacked in the favor of certain states, geopolitical concerns influence who gets to play the game.

The process that sorts states into IGOs may have powerful downstream effects on world politics. Membership in institutions is believed to shape state behavior. For example, scholars debate whether membership in the GATT/WTO increases trade among members (Rose, 2004; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Goldstein et al., 2007). Others show that the number and type of shared institutional memberships alter patterns of trade and conflict (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Boehmer et al., 2004; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Haftel, 2007; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). Membership can induce changes of behavior via socialization when members interact (Johnston, 2001; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007), and ties among states improve cooperation across many types of issues (Bohmelt, 2009).

Our results also present evidence of the selection bias that confronts research on the effectiveness of international institutions: the decision to join IGOs is endogenous to state preferences (e.g. Martin and Simmons, 1998). Skeptics have long claimed that ex ante power and interests make regimes "epiphenomenal" and cooperation shallow (Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Downs et al., 1996). We demonstrate that non-random selection occurs through screening members on the basis of geopolitical relations. This result is mixed news for advocates of multilateral institutions. On the one hand, the politicization of membership offers a rebuttal to those who dismiss compliance as the result of screening for compliant states. On the other hand, research about how joint IGO membership encourages peace needs to account for the role of geopolitical alignment as a determinant of IGO membership.

The next section reviews existing theoretical perspectives on IGO membership. Section 3 explains our argument about the role of geopolitical alignment as a force of attraction driving membership decisions. We specify observable implications to assess the theory's predictions for patterns of membership. In section 4, we introduce our data on economic IGOs and present the results of our empirical analysis of membership. A final section concludes.

2 IGO Membership

There is wide variation in the membership of international organizations, both in terms of the number and type of states that join. Founding members may coalesce from a group based on narrowly defined interests or come together as a loose amalgamation of diverse states. These governments often grant themselves discretion about enlargement. Vague membership rules and subjective policy evaluations enable members to strategically admit additional states while excluding others. The accession process of multilateral institutions ranges from the deposit of a ratification instrument to a rigorous review and vote by current members.[1] Even the most narrowly focused organizations show considerable variation in membership criteria — commodity organizations can include both producers and consumers, such as the International Cotton Advisory Committee, or focus exclusively on dominant producers, such as OPEC. Regional organizations expand their definition of geographic scope and in some cases include

[1]Some institutions adopt a unanimity rule to approve entry by new states (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012). See Hooghe et al. (2017) for detailed account of accession decision procedures for major international organizations.

non-regional members.[2] Indeed, several European states joined the Asian Development Bank as extra-regional members. The required level of policy reform may also differ by applicant. For example, WTO accession negotiations differ across members and over time with cases such as Afghanistan gaining entry for making moderate reforms while Iran remains subject to policy reviews that hold up its entry.

Keohane (1984) argues that demand for international institutions arises from their ability to resolve market failures as international organizations reduce transaction costs and overcome information problems. This implies we should observe a membership selection process based on common interests within the issue area regulated by the institution. Others argue that democracy and democratic transitions increase demand for IGOs as a means to credibly commit to policy reforms (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Kaoutzanis et al., 2016).

Scholars focusing on the optimal size of IGOs contend that states structure membership to address enforcement concerns and the distribution of gains from cooperation (e.g. Martin, 1992; Kahler, 1992; Koremenos et al., 2001; Drezner, 2007; Koremenos, 2016). The trade-off between depth of rules and breadth of participation generates conflicting incentives for the ideal membership size of institutions (Koremenos et al., 2001, p. 796). A small group with similar preferences can more readily reach agreements and monitor compliance but a larger group offers more benefits (Kahler, 1992; Stone et al., 2008; Thompson and Verdier, 2014). In some cases, small groups set the rules and gradually expand to admit new members as their preferences converge (Downs et al., 1998; Jupille et al., 2013; Gray et al., 2017). In other cases, states allocate different levels of decision authority across members (Gilligan, 2004; Stone, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2015). For these studies of institutional design, interests regulated by the regime determine the scope of membership.

Alongside their role in solving market failures within a given issue area, international institutions

[2] For evidence that IGO membership patterns have become less regional over time, see (Greenhill and Lupu, 2017).

can also serve as a forum for states to advance their foreign policy goals through economic statecraft. Research demonstrates that alliances shape trade flows (Gowa, 1994; Long and Leeds, 2006), and other sources of influence can skew trade toward states with good relations (Berger et al., 2013; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). States allocate foreign aid with attention to strategic interests (Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Bermeo, 2018). Do these same forces that shape bilateral flows influence decisions regarding multilateral cooperation? Scholars have identified evidence of horse-trading within multilateral fora (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Lim and Vreeland, 2013), while others contend that multilateral regimes neutralize the influence of foreign relations (Carnegie, 2014; Milner and Tingley, 2013).

We argue that the most powerful effect of geopolitics on multilateral institutions occurs at the accession stage. Discretion over membership allows states to politicize institutional outcomes while circumventing the norms and procedures that encourage impartiality among members. In effect, they treat IGOs as discriminatory clubs. In discriminatory clubs, actors select members on the basis of certain attributes that are distinct from their contribution to effective regulation.[3] Membership reflects both the ability to contribute to the joint project and an intrinsic value to the group. Several empirical studies of IGO membership suggest patterns of discrimination. For example, states screen out others seen to represent a security risk or those that differ in regime type (Donno et al., 2015; Kaoutzanis et al., 2016). Davis and Wilf (2017) find evidence that geopolitical alignment shapes both applications to join and accession negotiations in the trade regime. States are also more likely to cooperate with partners with whom they are linked in existing networks of agreements (Kinne, 2013). From this perspective, the appeal of joining an IGO depends on the composition of its members and not just mutual interests on a narrow issue.

[3]For discriminatory club good theory, see (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 385). This contrasts with modeling cooperation among anonymous states based on their relative size (e.g. Stone et al., 2008)

3 Geopolitical Alignment as Basis for IGO Membership

Through geopolitical discrimination, allies sort into IGOs together. Security ties change incentives for joint multilateral cooperation in at least two ways: *security externalities* and *security linkages*. The security externality mechanism focuses on the inherent connection between economic and military power. Robust economic growth and the efficient employment of domestic resources allow states to amass greater military capacity. As a result, the efficiency gains from economic cooperation can be channeled into military power (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994). States recognize these spillovers and respond strategically, steering economic ties toward allies and away from adversaries.

Scholars have found evidence that the security externality logic drives bilateral economic exchange between states (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). Both leaders and the general public believe that it will be safer to increase trade with allies and exclude rivals (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2018). Whether the mechanism extends to the multilateral context is unclear. Multilateral rules limit the ability of states to easily control the flow of material benefits. Moreover, if states gain positive utility from augmenting the capability of allies, they should demand full compliance with an institution's rules in order to maximize income gains. In practice, however, existing members often relax rules to facilitate the entry of their geopolitical allies. For example, the United States encouraged other GATT members to allow Japan to enter the trade regime without requiring the removal of substantial trade barriers, and it advocated admitting Korea to the OECD despite reservations by Korea to limit its financial liberalization. Finally, the security externality logic should be stronger in the presence of clearly divided alliance structures, such as those in the bipolar era.[4] But the end of the Cold War coincided with a surge of economic cooperation and an expanding scope for multilateral rules to govern these exchanges. The asymmetric

[4] Indeed, multilateral trade negotiations relied on bilateral deals based on the principal- supplier rule to isolate the exchange of benefits (Hicks and Gowa, 2018).

transfers and continuity beyond the Cold War suggest more is at work.

In addition to the security externality logic, we argue institutions facilitate resource transfers as part of a security linkage strategy. Whereas the security externality arises as an indirect byproduct of economic exchange, a security linkage represents a joint decision that brings economic and security interests together. In this strategy, the accession process becomes a bargaining chip for current members — and in particular the most powerful member states — to expand their geopolitical coalitions. Different preferences for security and economic cooperation create the opportunity for a mutually profitable exchange (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Davis, 2004; Poast, 2013). New entrants are motivated by the prospective economic gains from membership, while existing members seek enhanced leverage on security matters. The institutional context strengthens the linkage by providing an exclusion mechanism that restricts cooperation to the subset of members and increases the credibility of promised benefits to recipients.

Two features of multilateral economic institutions support security linkages. First, membership demarcates who receives the gains of cooperation.[5] Direct economic benefits include preferential market access, regulatory coordination, or financial assistance. Closer association with a particular group of states also confers reputational benefits as states improve their standing in the eyes of investors or gain credibility vis a vis hostile states (Kydd, 2001; Gray, 2013; Brooks et al., 2015; Gray and Hicks, 2014). Finally, members hold rights to participate in decision-making and shape future rules in their own favor.

Second, membership is not automatic. Even organizations that aspire to universal scope require an application and the approval of members, which opens the possibility for discrimination. For example, entry into GATT was easier for Japan than China, most IGOs refuse to admit Taiwan, and North and South Korea were unable to join the UN until 1991. Within the range of discretion allowed by the accession process, states can inject political relations as a criteria to favor friends with easier terms of

[5] As distinct from public goods, club goods allow for possibility of exclusion through limiting benefits to those who contribute to the provision of the club good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).

entry. Once a state joins, it continues to draw on member benefits going forward without having to engage in repeated negotiations.

While security linkages are easier through bilateral channels, multilateral institutions hold distinct advantages. The international institution supports burden-sharing across a larger group of states. It also offers political cover when the exchange relationship may arouse controversy at home or vis-a-vis other countries. By acting within the multilateral context, states “launder” their influence attempts (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, pp. 18). The meetings that accompany multilateralism offer opportunities for exchanges among leaders that can build trust to support credible commitments linking economic and security cooperation (Bearce, 2003).

In their use of multilateral economic institutions to support strategic partners, states balance commitment and control. Membership promises an ongoing stream of benefits through both the channel of a security externality and issue linkage. Powerful states want to bring into IGOs those states who are most in need of side payments as part of long term relations of exchange (Lake, 2009). Although states could be expelled, multilateral decision processes raise a barrier that limits such extreme sanctions. In this way, IGO membership adds credibility to the commitment by one state to share benefits with another. Thereafter, side payments offer flexibility for short-term demands. When a priority looms large for a powerful member, it can shift the allocation of benefits to serve its goals (Stone, 2011). Even within the constraints of multilateral procedures, both financial institutions and trade institutions provide ways for states to lend more and trade more with their allies among the membership (Thacker, 1999; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Stone, 2008; Dreher et al., 2013). Joint membership also facilitates issue linkages that reward cooperation outside of the institution. For example, temporary members of the UN Security Council receive more aid through UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Mikulaschek, 2018). Such deals shift the level of benefits among members, but within a smaller range than the gap between member and non-member states.

Through security externality and linkage policies, joint participation in economic institutions can strengthen security coalitions. Allies may use policy coordination outside of defense policies as one way to signal intentions and create a credible alliance commitment (Morrow, 2000). Supporting the entry of a security partner into multilateral institutions is difficult to reverse, especially relative to bilateral trade or aid flows. Any costs from letting in states that may not otherwise be optimal partners for economic cooperation are justified by the added credibility for their alliance. For example, Turkey's membership in the OECD introduced greater heterogeneity among members' business practices and yet was worthwhile for the positive security signal attained through such cooperation. Easy entry is a form of patronage to favor allies or bribery to gain leverage over critical swing states in a broad security coalition. Evidence suggests the strategy works: Powers (2004) demonstrates that alliances embedded in regional trade agreements are less prone to conflict, Henke (2017) shows that diplomatic ties have a positive effect on formation of multilateral military coalitions, and Poast (2013) finds that linking alliance ties with trade provisions increases alliance performance.

The flip side of favoritism for friends is the exclusion of rivals. This denies the benefits of the organization to rival states while holding out entry as a carrot to induce improved behavior. For example, China was close to having GATT accession approved when the Tiananmen massacre led to the suspension of negotiations. Similarly, the United States has wielded its veto over Iranian accession to the WTO as a bargaining chip in negotiations over its nuclear weapons program (Davis and Wilf, 2017). Russia's accession talks with the OECD were put on hold in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Once allowed into the organization, such leverage is severely diminished (Carnegie, 2014).

Our argument differs from functional regime theory because security interests lie outside regime jurisdiction. States may accept lower regime effectiveness for the sake of foreign policy benefits. But we recognize that state preferences may arise from both functional demand for gains from regime cooperation and geostrategic goals. Next we turn to evaluate how much geopolitics matters.

3.1 Testable Implications for Membership Patterns

To test our theory of IGO membership, we examine whether states are more likely to join international organizations when they share geopolitical alignment with current members. Our research design uses observational data about state behavior, making it hard to identify causal effects. To reduce the risk of a spurious finding, we use multiple measures of geopolitical alignment, explore alternative model specifications, and exploit dynamic breaks in alignment to more closely identify the mechanism.

We compare geopolitical alignment with economic interdependence as two forces that influence the demand for membership. Since geopolitical alignment and interests within the issue area overlap entirely in the area of security organizations, looking at economic organizations provides a better test. Our argument contends that security interests shape membership even in multilateral economic organizations, while the functional perspective would suggest a smaller role. We use shared alliances as our primary operationalization of geopolitical alignment, and analyze similarity of alliance portfolios and UN voting patterns as two alternative measures. Trade ties between states control for the underlying interdependence that contributes to functional demand for cooperation on economic policies.

We also examine conditions that influence the importance of security interests. First, we distinguish between geopolitical alignment with all members of international organizations versus the most powerful member states. In principle, any existing member state can link accession of potential members to shared security interests. Below, we measure a state's geopolitical ties with all IGO members to assess how comprehensively the state shares foreign policy interests with existing members. Then we separately measure a state's ties with powerful states, who are the most likely to engage in linkage strategies as they cement relationships with strategic partners (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012). Our relational measures of alignment differ from the monadic approach of current studies. For example, Kaoutzanis et al. (2016) focus on the regime type of new entrants and Donno et al. (2015) examine their conflict history.

Second, we analyze whether the role of geopolitical alignment differs over the lifespan of an IGO. Establishing an IGO raises transaction costs as states negotiate the IGO charter and set up a headquarters and financial base. While states may use security linkages to overcome the initial cooperation challenges, they could focus strictly on policy when establishing the rules of the game and only later politicize membership. Prior work on screening members has been limited to enlargement (Kydd, 2001; Schneider, 2009; Stone, 2011; Donno et al., 2015). Through separate analysis of each stage, we test how geopolitics shapes membership at founding and enlargement.

4 Empirical Analysis of IGO Membership Patterns

Our empirical tests have two primary objectives. First, we estimate the effect of geopolitical alignment on the probability of IGO membership in a series of regression models, controlling for functional economic interests. Second, we estimate the relative weight given to geopolitical and functional considerations. We use a finite mixture model to assess which observations are more consistent with geopolitics or economics, and to show the conditions under which states privilege one over the other.

4.1 Data

We analyze a sample of 252 economic IGOs for the period from 1949 to 2014.[6] Starting with the 534 IGOs in version 3.0 of the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse et al., 2004), we identify 399 with an economic focus based on information from the Yearbook

[6]Economic topics are broadly construed to include aid, finance, trade, and more general management of resources, travel, and standards relevant for economic exchange.

of International Organizations and the charter document that establishes each organization. Of these organizations, 252 have publicly available formal charters that enable us to collect data on the organization's geographic scope and membership restrictions. These IGOs form the primary sample we use in the empirical analysis.[7]

We conduct our analysis at the level of the state-IGO-year (Poast and Urpelainen, 2013; Donno et al., 2015). This unit of observation reflects the decision process we seek to model: when a state elects to join an IGO, it considers a specific organization and its existing member states. Our sample consists of all state-IGO-year pairings for 157 states in the 252 economic IGOs from 1949-2014.[8] The dependent variable, *IGO Membership*$_{ijt}$, is a dichotomous measure of whether state *i* is a member of organization *j* in year *t*. *IGO Membership* is equal to 1 in 24.2% of the 1.18 million observations. In the tests below, we also subset this sample to assess whether geopolitical alignment has different effects on joining as a founding member, joining later as by accession, or exiting the organization.[9]

Formal alliances are our primary measure of geopolitical alignment.[10] The variable *Average Alliances*$_{ijt}$ measures the proportion of IGO *j*'s member states with which state *i* shares a formal alliance in a given year. In the sample, it ranges from 0 (64.1% of observations) to 1 (2.7% of observations) with a mean value of 0.10. Second, *Lead State Alliance*$_{ijt}$ indicates whether state *i* shares an alliance with the leading economic power among member states of IGO *j* during year *t*, with economic power measured annually by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In our sample, states are allied with an IGO's most powerful member state in 17.4% of state-IGO-years.

[7]Results are not contingent on our exclusion of IGOs without charter documents.

[8]IGOs enter the dataset in the year in which they are founded and continue until 2014 or the organization ends. We include all states listed in the COW state system for which we have data on covariates. Covariate coverage primarily excludes small states (e.g., Grenada) or those where data is unavailable (North Korea).

[9]Donno et al. (2015) focus their analysis of IGO accession on the enlargement phase, and Poast and Urpelainen (2013) demonstrate that the politics of forming new IGOs differs from joining existing IGOs.

[10]Data on alliances, which include defense pacts and neutrality or nonaggression pacts, comes from version 4.1 of the COW Formal Alliances dataset (Gibler, 2009).

We also analyze two alternative measures of geopolitical alignment. *S-scores* is a continuous measure of similarity across states' entire portfolio of alliances; it reaches its maximum (1) when two states have identical alliance portfolios.[11] *UN Ideal Point Similarity* is a continuous variable that increases as the UN voting records of two states converge (Bailey et al., 2017). This measure offers a broader perspective on the foreign policy orientation of states across a range of topics on the international agenda and has been widely used in the literature to measure geopolitical alignment (e.g. Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Each alternative measure is operationalized to create both an "average" and "lead state" variable.

Trade with IGO members and trade with the IGO lead state measure the impact of shared economic ties.[12] We include monadic variables for income (GDP per capita, logged), market size (GDP, logged), and trade openness (total trade / GDP). Conditioning on these economic variables addresses the possibility that economic flows and security interests are jointly determined.

We control for additional variables that influence the demand to join IGOs and the willingness of members to grant entry. Polity scores capture the tendency of democratic states to join and form IGOs with higher frequency (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015). We account for the screening out of conflict-prone states (Donno et al., 2015) by including a variable measuring the average number of fatal militarized disputes (MIDs) between state *i* and members of IGO *j*.[13] To address potential diffusion effects, the variable *Total IGO Membership* is a count of members in each IGO, which could exert positive attraction for other states to enter. Since neighbors may exert stronger influence over states, we also include a variable for *Members from Region* indicating the number of states residing in state *i*'s

[11] S-scores are calculated using the COW formal alliance dataset.

[12] Bilateral trade data is from the IMF Direction of Trade dataset. The "trade with members" variable measures average (logged) volume of imports and exports between state *i* and each member of IGO *j*. The "trade with lead state" variable measures (logged) trade volume with the lead state. We add one before taking the log to ensure values of zero trade are not excluded due to the mathematical transformation.

[13] MIDs data are from the dyadic version of the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset .

geographic region that are members of IGO *j*. Separate control variables measure shared colonial history as well as a state's average geographic distance from IGO *j*'s member states.[14]

Finally, the design of the IGO influences its openness to new members. An indicator for *Universal IGO* identifies organizations without any formal restrictions on membership eligibility. The remaining organizations are selective through a negotiated terms of accession or specific limits on eligibility such as commodity production, culture, or region.[15] We account for geographic restrictions via an indicator for regional organizations, and another for whether a state belongs to the specific region of the IGO.[16] The variable *State-IGO Same Region* addresses the likelihood that regional IGOs accept members from their region at a higher rate than other states.[17] Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we model time dependence by incorporating a cubic polynomial for *t* in all models. A Cold War indicator (1947-1991) adjusts for baseline differences in membership rates during the bipolar era.

4.2 Logistic Regression Models

We first use a logistic regression model to predict the dichotomous outcome variable, IGO membership. Independent variables are lagged by one year, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. We estimate the following model of IGO membership for state *i* in IGO *j* and year *t*:

$$\Pr(\text{IGO membership}_{ijt} = 1) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 X_{ijt-1})$$

The model predicts IGO membership using our primary operationalization of geopolitical alignment, formal alliances. All models include a set of control variables X_{ijt}, which are measured at the level of the state-IGO-year (e.g., Trade and fatal MIDs with IGO Members); state-IGO (State-IGO Same Region),

[14]Data on geographic distance and colonial linkages are from CEPII.

[15]This variable was coded from IGO treaty documents. Nine percent of IGOs in our sample are universal.

[16]State regions are coded using the World Bank's "country and lending groups" classification scheme (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups). IGOs are coded as regional if their charter or organizational title references a geographic region.

[17]Several IGOs are regional in scope of work but allow states outside of the region to become members.

state (Trade Openness, GDP, GDP per capita, Polity); and IGO (Universal Membership, Regional IGO).

We begin using the *Average Alliances* measure of geopolitical alignment. Table 1 displays results for a reduced form specification (Model 1) and a full model with all control variables (Model 2). In these first specifications, we assess membership in the broadest sense, including states' entry into an IGO and each year of continued membership.[18] The results support our primary hypothesis: as states share more alliances with an IGO's member states, they are significantly more likely to join the organization. In the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the *Average Alliances* measure increases the probability of membership, on average, from 23 to 26%. The relationship holds when controlling for functional economic interests (measured by trade with IGO members), which also has a positive and significant association with IGO membership.

Model 3 examines state entry into IGOs. This sample omits the years after a state has joined an organization, acknowledging that they rarely reevaluate membership decisions in any given year. Both geopolitical alignment and trade ties have a strong, positive association with entry. Models 4-6 analyze how linkage politics shape IGO membership at different stages in the evolution of a regime. Model 4 examines membership patterns in the year of IGO *formation*.[19] Model 5 examines state entry by accession in the years after the IGO is created.[20] In both periods of formation and enlargement, geopolitical alignment with IGO members has a significant association with entry. The coefficient on the *Average Alliances* variable is larger in the formation stage, offering some evidence that geopolitics are relatively more important when IGO is first created. Model 6 reverses the membership question to analyze exit from IGOs; shared alliances do not significantly affect the likelihood of a state exiting IGOs.[21]

[18]This is consistent with Stone (2011), who theorizes participation in IGOs as an ongoing process of decisions to enter and continue cooperation.

[19]Excludes observations before and after the formation year yields a smaller sample. Forty-nine IGOs are created before 1950 and drop from the sample.

[20]As in model 3, this specification also excludes observations after a state has joined an IGO.

[21]This model evaluates when members leave an IGO. Observations enter the sample once a state joins an IGO and remain until the state exits or the IGO ceases to exist. We use rare events logit because exit is very infrequent (0.11% of observations).

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Baseline	Full	Entry	Formation	Expansion	Exit	State-IGO FE	Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.001^{***}	2.121^{***}	1.244^{***}	1.548^{***}	1.249^{***}	-0.040	2.572^{***}	0.306^{***}
	(0.127)	(0.196)	(0.305)	(0.159)	(0.379)	(0.319)	(0.307)	(0.025)
Trade with Members	0.282^{***}	0.338^{***}	0.240^{***}	0.207^{***}	0.314^{***}	-0.048^{*}	0.065^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.056)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Polity	-0.004	0.011^{*}	0.013	0.015^{**}	0.013	-0.006	0.066^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.0004)
GDP	-0.176^{***}	0.077	0.048	-0.161^{***}	0.003	0.021	0.420^{***}	0.018^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.003)
GDP per capita		-0.217^{***}	-0.013	-0.040^{*}	-0.028	-0.164^{***}	-0.411	-0.003
		(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.084)	(0.003)
Trade Openness		-0.018^{**}	-0.046^{***}	-0.115^{**}	-0.055^{***}	-0.015	0.002	-0.0002^{*}
		(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.0001)
Universal IGO		0.177^{**}	1.147^{***}	-0.143	1.276^{***}	-0.196		0.030^{***}
		(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.126)		(0.007)
Regional IGO		-1.315^{***}	-2.362^{***}	-2.616^{***}	-2.239^{***}	-1.807^{***}		-0.051^{***}
		(0.127)	(0.171)	(0.136)	(0.206	(0.673)		(0.007)
Cold War		-0.062	-0.209^{***}	-0.255^{***}	-0.169^{**}	-1.132^{***}	-0.274^{**}	
		(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.097)	(0.070)	(0.296)	(0.107)	
Observations	1,176,069	1,176,069	912,049	18,723	893,332	285,177	912,049	1,176,069
# IGOs	252	252	252	203	252	249	252	252
# States	157	157	157	155	156	157	157	157

Table 1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 2-6 include the following controls (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Model 7 re-estimates the entry model with a fixed effect for state-IGO pairs, addressing unobserved heterogeneity unique to each state and IGO that influence the likelihood of membership. The effect of geopolitical alignment is even stronger. Trade with IGO members also significantly increases IGO membership. Finally, a difference-in-differences specification (Model 8) examines how changes in geopolitical alignment influence shifts in IGO membership among state-IGO pairs.[22] The coefficient estimates suggest a strong effect of geopolitical alignment: a one standard deviation shift in *Average Alliances* increases the probability of membership by 6.65%.

In Figure 1, we compare the effect of *Average Alliances* with the effect of holding an alliance with the lead state of an IGO. Geopolitical alignment with an IGO's most powerful member state has a significantly larger effect. Shifting the *Average Alliances* variable by one standard deviation above the mean (from .095 to .315) increases the probability of IGO membership, on average, by more than 3 percentage points. The influence of large states appears even greater – moving the *Lead State Alliance* variable from 0 to 1 increases the probability of membership by more than 7 percentage points, equivalent to adding an alliance with 50% of other IGO members. These are substantial effects, given a baseline membership rate of only 24%. The figure shows consistent results for the alternative measures (*S-scores* and *UN Ideal Point similarity*). Trade with IGO members shows the expected positive effect.

Figure A1 in the appendix shows a similar effect of *Average Alliances* across different samples of economic IGOs. We find larger effects in the sub-sample of 89 highly salient organizations with greater potential for side payments.[23] The effect of geopolitical alignment is notably larger in non-regional organizations that offer more discretion than regional bodies. Finally, we find a smaller effect in universal organizations where membership is less open to power politics.

[22]Following Lechner (2011), we use a linear probability model for the difference-in-differences specification. We remove the "Cold War" indicator in this specification, since the model includes year fixed effects.

[23]We define as salient any IGO which received at least 50 references in major newspapers during founding year or when our sample ends in 2014.



Figure 1: *Substantive Effect of Geopolitical Alignment*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting a variable of interest. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 bootstrapped simulations of the full model (Model 2).

Expanding our sample beyond the focus on economic organizations, we also compare the effect of geopolitical alignment across issue areas (see appendix Figure A2). As expected, security-oriented IGOs feature the strongest association between alliance patterns and institutional membership. Compared to economic IGOs, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the average alliance measure is approximately twice as large in security organizations. Geopolitical alignment exhibits the smallest pull in decisions to join environmental IGOs. The ordering across these issue areas supports the logic that states use the institutional venue for building a security coalition, whether directly coordinating security policies or drawing on economic benefits. Environmental organizations that regulate by restricting harmful policies for the sake of public goods provision offer fewer opportunities for side payments to allies.

To address concerns about endogeneity between alliances and IGO membership, we examine whether *sudden reversals* in states' geopolitical orientation has an impact on IGO membership. In cases where states experience sharp breaks in their alliance patterns — defined as changing at least ten alliances in a given year (e.g., Cuba following the 1959 Revolution) — we ask whether they are more likely to enter organizations with their new alliance partners and exit IGOs populated by former allies. Table 2 shows that both entry and exit behavior show a significant correlation with states' new geopolitical orientation. Column 1 shows that states are significantly more likely to enter organizations with their new allies following a shift in geopolitical orientation. In Column 2, we see that sudden reversals in geopolitical alignment also affect the probability of exit. States are less likely to exit organizations with new allies, and more likely to exit organizations populated by their former security partners.

Additional robustness tests are displayed in the Appendix. We ensure that our results are not driven by a specific type of economic IGO by estimating the main model separately on trade, bank, and commodity organizations. Geopolitical alignment has a positive and statistically significant effect on membership in each sample, with the strongest correlation among bank-type IGOs. To assess how rules limit or augment the impact of geopolitics, we include an indicator for stringent IGO accession procedures that require more than a majority of members to approve applicant, and interact this with the average alliances variable. The negative interaction effect implies that geopolitics plays less of a role in IGOs with a stringent accession process. We estimate a model with separate coefficients for geopolitical alignment in the Cold War and post-Cold War era to confirm that the relationship is not specific to one era. Indeed, alliances matter less for membership decisions during the Cold War. Results are robust to the use of defense pacts instead of all alliances; the exclusion of NATO members; the exclusion of eight economic IGOs that serve as alliances (e.g. Commonwealth of Independent States); a lagged dependent variable; and additional controls for foreign direct investment, states' total alliance memberships, geographic distance between a state and existing members of an IGO. Finally, we fit a Cox proportional hazards model to test whether geopolitical alignment influences states' time to entry for each IGO. In all cases, shared security interests exert a strong influence on IGO membership. See Tables A1-A3 for these results.

	(1)	(2)
	Entry	Exit
New Alliance with Members	0.267*	-0.544^{*}
	(0.145)	(0.299)
Dropped Alliance with Members	0.062	1.912***
	(0.142)	(0.444)
Trade with Members	0.151***	-0.006
	(0.030)	(0.046)
Polity	0.014	-0.087^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.030)
GDP	-0.063	0.261**
	(0.079)	(0.123)
GDP per capita	0.423***	-0.168
	(0.136)	(0.256)
Trade Openness	-0.260^{**}	0.112
	(0.105)	(0.253)
Universal IGO	0.784***	-0.181
	(0.162)	(0.392)
Cold War	-1.922^{***}	-2.891^{**}
	(0.527)	(1.242)
Observations	64,283	19,698
# IGOs	251	199
# States	72	72

Table 2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Sudden Reversals in Geopolitical Orientation*. Models examine whether sharp breaks in geopolitical alignment, defined as a state adding or dropping at least ten alliances in a given year, affect the probability of entry (Model 1) and exit (Model 2). The sample includes the five year span after a state experiences a sharp break in geopolitical alignment. Models include all controls in Table 1, Column 2. Statistical significance denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

4.3 Finite Mixture Model

We have seen that across a large sample of economic institutions, geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of IGO membership. This is important evidence for the effect of geopolitical alignment, but leaves two additional questions unanswered. First, how powerful is our hypothesized geopolitical model compared to the functional economic explanation? Second, under what conditions do states privilege geopolitical considerations over economic interests? To answer these questions, we estimate a finite mixture model. The mixture model allows for multiple distinct theoretical processes to drive outcomes. As Imai and Tingley (2012, p. 218) explain, "each observation is assumed to be generated either from a statistical model implied by one of the rival theories or more generally from a weighted combination of multiple statistical models under consideration." In a single framework, researchers can judge the relative explanatory power of competing theories.

In our case, we hypothesize that some membership decisions are consistent with the geopolitical alignment logic and others are consistent with a functional explanation. The analysis assumes that each observation comes from a probability distribution over the two competing models. For example, the observation corresponding to Turkey's membership in the European Union in 2010 may have a 25% likelihood of arising from the geopolitical model, and a 25% likelihood for the functional economic model.[24] These probabilities can be interpreted as the relative weight placed on geopolitics and economics when determining membership in a given state-IGO-year. The estimation of weights is guided by a set of *model-predicting* variables which help determine which model is most appropriate. For state *i* and IGO *j* in year *t*, the probability of assignment to the geopolitical model (π_G) is:

$$\pi_{G,ijt} \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\delta + \delta_1 \text{Cold War}_t + \delta_2 \text{Polity}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 \text{Universal}_j)$$

The *model-predicting* variables are akin to scope conditions, informing the relative applicability of each competing model. These variables are measured at different levels of analysis, matching the multilevel nature of our state-IGO-year sample. The first is an indicator for the Cold War period, reflecting

[24]See Figure A3 in the Appendix for the distribution of model assignments in the fitted model.

the realist expectation that geopolitical considerations will be strongest when the distribution of power is characterized by bipolarity. The second is a measure of domestic regime type (Polity scores), capturing the liberal notion that the structure of state-society relations shapes foreign policy decisions. Third, we include the indicator for whether an IGO's charter contains a provision for limiting membership or aims to achieve universal membership.[25]

For each observation, the outcome (IGO Membership) is generated via a weighted combination of the geopolitical and functional economic models.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Geopolitical: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) &= logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_3 D_{ijt-1}) \\ \text{Economic: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) &= logit^{-1}(\alpha_2 + \delta_1 \text{Trade}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 D_{ijt-1}) \end{aligned}$$

We specify the geopolitical model using the *Average Alliances* variable and the control variables included in the full model from Table 1 (Column 2) while excluding the measure of trade ties. The functional economic model excludes the alliances variable and instead includes *Trade with Members*.[26] These specifications make it possible to identify a "geopolitical" and "economic" model *a priori*.

We first provide results for the two competing models — geopolitics versus functional economic preferences — that drive patterns of state membership in economic IGOs. Table 3 displays coefficient estimates from the geopolitical (Column 1) and economic (Column 2) components of the mixture model, as well as a pooled model of IGO membership formation for comparison (Column 3).[27]

In the geopolitical model, the estimated effect of *Average Alliances* is nearly twice as large as the original pooled estimate (shown in Column 3). A one standard deviation (0.22) increase in the *Average Alliances* variable is associated with a 5.98% increase in the probability of IGO membership, and the shift

[25] Koremenos et al. (2001) contend that IGOs limit membership to address enforcement or uncertainty about preferences.

[26] Though both models include the same control variables, the coefficients are allowed to vary across the two theories.

[27] The model is estimated using the *flexmix* package in R (Grun and Leisch, 2008). Coefficients and standard errors are obtained by estimating a weighted logistic regression, with weights corresponding to each observation's assignment to the two competing models.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Average Alliances	4.519***		2.121***
	(0.175)		(0.196)
Trade with Members		0.947***	0.338***
		(0.040)	(0.039)
Polity	−0.023***	0.019***	0.011*
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
GDP	0.226***	−0.100***	0.077
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.063)
GDP per capita	−0.136***	−0.428***	−0.217***
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Trade Openness	0.019***	−0.251***	−0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Universal IGO	0.505***	0.118	0.177**
	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.062)
Regional IGO	−2.720***	−0.795***	−1.315***
	(0.255)	(0.130)	(0.127)
Fatal MIDs with Members	3.304**	26.546***	11.043***
	(1.671)	(2.780)	(2.305)
Existing Members from Region	0.087***	0.484***	0.159***
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Cold War	−0.146***	−0.169***	−0.062
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Observations	567,262	608,453	1,176,079

Table 3: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models.* Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2). Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

from no alliance with a lead state to holding such an alliance is associated with a 8.76% increase in the probability of IGO membership (see table A4 for lead state results). The larger effect suggests that among the observations identified by the model as consistent with a geopolitical logic, security relationships have a very powerful influence on IGO membership decisions. The key independent variable in the economic model, *Trade with Members*, is similarly larger in magnitude than in the pooled model.[28] Some control variables have different effects across the two models, i.e. states with higher polity scores tend to join fewer IGOs among observations consistent with the geopolitical model, but join IGOs at a higher rate in the economic model.

The mixture model compares the explanatory power of each theory. In our case, the model estimates that the geopolitical explanation is nearly as powerful as the functional model: approximately 48.3% of observations in the sample are consistent with the geopolitical model, while the remaining 51.7% are more accurately explained by the functional economic model.[29] This is notable given that the sample includes only economic institutions. When we measure trade and alliances with the lead state in an IGO, the mixture model assigns an even greater proportion of observations to the geopolitical model, with 59.9% of membership decisions driven by geopolitics (see Table A4 in the Appendix).

Because each observation is assigned to a weighted combination of the competing geopolitical and economic models, we can assess the conditions under which the geopolitical logic dominates functional economic considerations. Figure 2 demonstrates that as the Cold War progressed, states put a greater emphasis on geopolitics in their IGO membership decisions. This trend declined slightly in the waning years of the Cold War before increasing sharply as the fall of the Iron Curtain shifted states' geopolitical orientations. Although the tendency to prioritize geopolitics has declined in the post-Cold War era, states

[28] Increasing *Trade with Members* by one standard deviation (6.09) is associated with a 22.45% increase in the probability of IGO membership.

[29] We calculate this measure by summing over all observations' probability of assignment to Model 1 and Model 2.



Figure 2: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for each year in the sample.

still emphasize geopolitical considerations approximately 48% of the time. This evidence counters the view that Cold War bipolarity is necessary for security to shape membership decisions.

We can compare the geopolitical and functional economic models across a range of other dimensions (See Figure 3 and Table A5 in the Appendix). For example, democratic states appear to be less geopolitical in their approach to IGO membership. Approximately 37% of state-IGO-year observations with democratic countries are consistent with the geopolitical model. Among non-democracies, 55% of observations are driven primarily by geopolitical alignment.

Finally, the mixture model can track changes in particular states' IGO membership behavior. Figures A4-A8 in the Appendix demonstrate how Russia, Iran, China, the United States, and Japan have shifted over time in the attention each state devotes to geopolitical considerations when making institutional membership choices. Notably, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the outward turn of China starting in the 1970s correspond with less weight given to geopolitics even as they remain higher than the United



Figure 3: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations consistent with the geopolitical model. Each barplot represents a different sample for the specified subset of observations. The left graph uses the average state alliance measure, and the right graph shows estimates from the lead state alliance measure.

States. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within, vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded.

5 Concluding remarks

This paper demonstrates that geopolitical alignment increases the probability that states will join the same international economic institutions. This relationship holds both when institutions form and when they expand. We find that geopolitics more fully accounts for half of state membership in economic IGOs, roughly equivalent to the explanatory power of economic interdependence. States weigh security and economic interests when making decisions about multilateral economic cooperation, and our evidence indicates that in many cases the former loom larger than the latter. Security externality and security linkage strategies motivate this pattern – while such logic is well known to shape bilateral trade and aid flows, we demonstrate that states act on these incentives to use multilateral economic organizations as a tool of economic statecraft by geopolitical discrimination at the time of membership.

Our argument introduces a different source of demand for institutions outside of promoting cooperation in an issue area. Geopolitical discrimination over membership opens the possibility for more impact by the institution on state behavior because entry is not simply derivative of preferences within the issue area. Subordinating membership choices to security interests, however, could undercut effectiveness. Just as political allocation undermines the efficacy of foreign aid (Dreher et al., 2013), the geopolitics of IGO membership may distort the credibility of institutional commitments. As security ties take precedence over policy reform, compliance levels may worsen and result in lower cooperation. This in turn creates pressures for institutional proliferation to address the shortcomings of existing IGOs.

The foreign policy role of IGOs should shape how scholars assess institutional effectiveness. Evaluating outcomes based on policy reforms within the issue area neglects the foreign policy benefits of membership. Identifying a causal relationship between institutions and peace becomes even more difficult, however, in light of the geopolitical bias in membership. To the extent that states join IGOs because they already have common security interests, a spurious relationship could generate the observed correlation between IGO membership and peace.

The question of why and how states cooperate is fundamentally connected to the question of *who* states choose as partners for cooperation. Joining an institution is not the same as signing a contract with an anonymous actor. In the small community of states, political relations provide a rich context as both sources of information and mutual interests. Against this backdrop, states form club-style IGOs that favor entry by friends and exclude rivals.

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Appendices

The Forces of Attraction:

How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions

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A Figures

A.1 Figure A1: Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs



Figure A1: *Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Average Alliances variable from each sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

A.2 Figure A2: Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas



Figure A2: *Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Average Alliances variable from each sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. IGOs are coded as "broadly" part of an issue area if there is any mention of topics related to the issue in the IGO charter document or the description in the Yearbook of International Organizations, and "narrowly" part of an issue area if there is no mention of another issue. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

A.3 Figure A3: Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model



Figure A3: *Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the frequency with which observations in our sample of state membership in economic IGOs are sorted into the geopolitical model. In the finite mixture model, each state-IGO-year observation is assigned a weighted mixture of the economic and geopolitical models. A value of one on the x-axis indicates an observation is wholly generated by the geopolitical model. The figure reveals two clusters of observations: one group that is primarily consistent with the geopolitical model (around .55 on the x-axis) and one group that is more consistent with the economic model (around .35).

A.4 Figure A4: Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A4: *Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Russia's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The collapse of the USSR in 1991 is reflected in the figure as a sharp reduction in the share of observations attributed to geopolitics.

A.5 Figure A5: Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A5: *Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Iran's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). In the figure, the period of alliance ties with the United States during the fifties and sixties appears in the form of more geopolitical decisions on membership, and the break of relations with the United States in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution corresponds to a lower level of geopolitical motivation as alliances are less important for Iranian membership patterns.

A.6 Figure A6: China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A6: *China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of China's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). China's outward turn and attempt to restore diplomatic ties in the 1970s is reflected as a decrease in the share of observations attributed to the geopolitical model.

A.7 Figure A7: United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model



Figure A7: *United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the United States's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The United States has a low propensity to join IGOs based on geopolitics than other countries, according to the mixture model. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded.

A.8 Figure A8: Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Mode



Figure A8: *Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the Japan's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). Japan is among the least geopolitical in its determination of membership decisions, which conforms to the post-war choices to privilege economic growth and rely on its steady alliance with the United States. Exclusion as a former enemy politicized some of its entry decisions in the 1950s, but the Japanese government sought to renew ties with a world that had been broken during the war; it applied to join any organization possible as part of this strategy to restore its position within international society. Then, the end of the Cold War increased uncertainty for Japan both in relation to the United States and the rising power of China. Japan began to pay more attention to geopolitics in its foreign aid policies in the 1990s, reflected as a slight uptick in proportion of IGO membership decisions that reflect a geopolitical logic.

B Tables

Table A1: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	FDI	Lag DV	Exc NATO	CW	Defense Pacts	Alliance Count	Distance	Cox PH
Avg. Alliances	1.859***	1.153***	2.528***	2.256***	2.008***	2.518***	2.042***	1.153***
	(0.217)	(0.145)	(0.158)	(0.188)	(0.196)	(0.205)	(0.197)	(0.112)
Incoming FDI	−0.043*							
	(0.026)							
Outgoing FDI	0.001							
	(0.008)							
Cold War * Avg. Alliances				−0.276**				
				(0.140)				
Alliance Count						−0.013**		
						(0.007)		
Avg Distance							−3.691e-5	
							(2.277e-5)	
Trade w/ Members	0.553***	0.154***	0.320***	0.338***	0.341***	0.325***	0.331***	0.150***
	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.023)
Polity	0.023***	0.026***	0.018***	0.011*	0.009	0.009	0.014**	0.022***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Cold War	−0.011	−0.393***	−0.106**	−0.004	−0.078**	−0.049	−0.045	0.305***
	(0.039)	(0.100)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.365)	(0.038)	(0.101)
Observations	597,742	1,157,356	993,705	1,176,079	1,176,079	1,176,079	1,176,079	882,898
# IGOs	238	252	252	252	252	252	252	189
# States	143	156	131	157	157	157	157	120

Table A1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models*. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include the following controls (not shown): *GDP*, *GDP per capita*, *Trade Openness*, *Universal IGO*, *Regional IGO*, *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A2: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership (Excluding Alliance-related IGOs)

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Full	Entry	Formation	Expansion	Exit	State-IGO FE	Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.066***	1.217***	1.638***	1.207***	0.011	2.571***	0.301***
	(0.200)	(0.309)	(0.166)	(0.382)	(0.315)	(0.308)	(0.025)
Trade with Members	0.341***	0.242***	0.201***	0.320***	−0.047*	0.067***	0.005***
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.001)
Polity	0.012**	0.014	0.015**	0.014	−0.006	0.065***	0.002***
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.0004)
GDP	0.077	0.044	−0.156***	0.029	0.020	0.413***	0.018***
	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.113)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.219***	−0.014	−0.047**	−0.029	−0.156**	−0.410***	−0.004
	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.003)
Trade Openness	−0.022***	−0.053**	−0.114**	−0.063**	−0.014	0.002	−0.0002*
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.0001)
Universal IGO	0.175**	1.144***	−0.177*	1.274***	−0.194		0.030***
	(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.126)		(0.007)
Regional IGO	−1.289***	−2.323***	−2.560***	−2.205***	−1.797***		−0.051***
	(0.129)	(0.172)	(0.139)	(0.207)	(0.686)		(0.007)
Cold War	−0.062	−0.216***	−0.105	−0.173**	−1.147***	−0.271**	
	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.103)	(0.070)	(0.296)	(0.107)	
Observations	1,135,417	855,836	18,097	1,117,320	282,542	873,927	1,135,417
# IGOs	244	244	196	244	242	244	244
# States	157	157	155	156	157	157	157

Table A2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. The sample excludes IGOs which the COW alliance dataset codes as constituting an alliance. Controls include (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3: Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership (IGO Type)

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Avg. Alliances	2.249***	0.831***	2.950***	1.798***
	(0.215)	(0.304)	(0.289)	(0.302)
Stringent Accession	0.121***			
	(0.047)			
Avg. Alliances * Stringent Accession	−0.530***			
	(0.204)			
Trade with Members	0.337***	0.382***	0.476***	0.165***
	(0.040)	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.048)
Polity	0.011*	0.057***	0.003	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
GDP	0.082	−0.120	−0.105	0.324***
	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.077)	(0.087)
GDP per capita	−0.216***	−0.054	−0.179***	−0.298***
	(0.044)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.074)
Trade Openness	−0.019**	−0.052**	−0.033***	−0.011*
	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Universal IGO	0.201***		−0.052	0.379**
	(0.065)		(0.068)	(0.148)
Cold War	−0.062	0.287*	−0.225***	0.060
	(0.039)	(0.173)	(0.086)	(0.067)
Observations	1,160,716	50,582	147,970	167,173

Table A3: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. Model 1 includes the full sample and tests the interaction between stringent accession procedures and geopolitical alignment. Models 2-4 replicate the main specification in sub-samples for three types of single purpose economic IGOs: free trade agreements (2), banks (3), and commodity organizations (4). Controls include (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *Regional IGO*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A4: IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical	Economic	Pooled
Alliance with Lead State	1.445***		1.019***
	(0.090)		(0.101)
Trade with Lead State		0.446***	0.084**
		(0.018)	(0.012)
Polity	−0.022*	0.013	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)
GDP	0.241***	0.140***	0.217***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)
GDP per capita	−0.037	−0.430***	−0.117***
	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.045)
Trade Openness	0.013*	−0.195***	−0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Universal IGO	0.488***	−0.032	0.175**
	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.068)
Regional IGO	−1.889***	−0.720***	−1.231***
	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.114)
Fatal MIDs with Members	8.205***	23.720***	11.289***
	(1.752)	(2.826)	(3.197)
Existing Members from Region	0.114***	0.866***	0.183***
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Cold War	−0.279***	0.029	−0.053
	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.041)
Observations	914,934	211,151	1,126,085

Table A4: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2) with respect to the lead state of an IGO. Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. Statistical significance is denoted by: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

Table A5: Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model

	1	0
Cold War	0.483	0.483
Universal IGO	0.621	0.465
Regional IGO	0.464	0.508
Democratic State	0.366	0.552

Table A5: *Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model*: The table shows the percent of observations assigned to the geopolitical model for a range of independent variables. Estimated assignment is from the finite mixture model described in Table 2.