The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions [*]

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Abstract

Multilateral institutions help states manage interdependence and secure gains from economic cooperation. While normative and procedural constraints encourage impartiality among members, entry into these institutions is highly geopolitical. We argue that the accession process promotes linkages between security interests and other issue areas regulated by institutions. Through discrimination in the choice of members, states exclude rivals and share benefits with favored partners. The geopolitical origins of IGO membership constitute a key mechanism linking economic cooperation to security interests and adds to research on the mutual relationship between international security and economics. Analyzing membership patterns for 252 multilateral economic organizations, we show robust evidence that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations. Finally, we use a finite mixture model to examine the relative importance of economic and security considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for about *half* of the membership decisions in economic institutions.

1 Introduction

How do security ties between states shape multilateral economic cooperation? Existing work demonstrates that concerns about security shape *bilateral* economic exchange. Because the income gains from economic cooperation can enhance military power, states prefer to cooperate with partners who are unlikely to become adversaries in a future conflict. This "security externality" promotes bilateral trade flows and preferential treaties among allies (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997).

Compared to bilateral relations, however, the multilateral setting is less conducive to geopolitical discrimination. At a normative level, non-discrimination represents a core principle of multilateralism. From a procedural standpoint, collective decision-making makes it more difficult to direct benefits to specific member states. Both characteristics of multilateral institutions render them inefficient as tools of economic statecraft. Nevertheless, since multilateral institutions govern a large amount of economic activity, states have incentives to exploit these gains for geopolitical advantage.

We argue that states resolve this dilemma by exploiting discretion over membership to deepen ties with allies and exclude rivals. Selective membership in multilateral economic organizations creates room for security concerns to affect economic policy. Existing members use the accession process to expand and reinforce their geopolitical coalitions, while new applicants benefit from economic gains.

Our theory departs from the functional view of institutions, which suggests that states choose partners who offer the greatest opportunity for profit from policy coordination (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984; Farrell and Newman, 2015). As a result, we can explain puzzling cases of institutional membership that make little sense from a functional perspective. Why did Turkey enter the OECD in 1961 despite its low performance on economic indicators? Why has Japan resisted joining the Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank despite its strong commitment to development aid in East Asia? In the former case, NATO solidarity motivated lowering OECD standards for the entry of an ally, while in the latter case, rivalry with China led Japan to refrain from joining a Chinese initiative for regional leadership.

The logic of linking security to participation in international organizations goes beyond solving a market failure problem or reducing security externalities. Countries strategically exploit the cooperation gains within an issue area to reinforce geopolitical goals outside of the regime. This allows for a broader range of security-based cooperation than one would expect from the presence of security externalities alone. The use of IGO membership to build coalitions can explain asymmetrical transfers to allies and economic exchange outside of Cold War alliance structures. It can further account for decisions to include weak compliers while excluding potential contributors.

Our focus on accession politics is important because membership in institutions is believed to shape the behavior of states. Empirical studies assess the power of institutions by comparing the policies of members and non-members. For example, the debate about the effectiveness of the multilateral trade regime assesses whether GATT/WTO members trade more with each other than non-members (Rose, 2004; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz, 2007). Environmental institutions are adjudged as consequential if members reduce pollution levels following entry (Breitmeier, Underdal and Young, 2011). Others show that the number and type of shared institutional memberships alter patterns of trade and conflict (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, 2004; Ingram, Robinson and Busch, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Haftel, 2007; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). Membership can also induce changes of behavior via socialization when members interact with each other (Johnston, 2001; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007). Ties formed among states improve their ability to cooperate across many types of issues (Bohmelt, 2009).

We test our argument by analyzing membership patterns in a broad range of international economic organizations. Economic IGOs provide an opportunity to evaluate geopolitical motivations where institutional rules do not directly implicate security interests. Our theory implies that geopolitical alignment will drive the decisions to join and remain in IGOs. Formal alliances serve as our primary measure of geopolitical alignment, and we supplement this measure with additional indicators of shared foreign policy interests.

We compare the effect of geopolitical alignment with the functional expectation that states will prioritize economic interests when considering membership in economic IGOs. We use trade flows to gauge whether economic interdependence explains demand for institutionalized cooperation. One could expect that low levels of economic exchange would generate a need for rules to facilitate the expansion of ties, or the opposite relationship in which high trade flows would motivate rule creation to manage relations surrounding these interests. In either case, trade ties influence demand for mutual cooperation.

A series of empirical tests show that geopolitical alignment with current member states has a significant influence on the probability of IGO membership at every stage of multilateral cooperation. The relationship between geopolitics and membership patterns is substantively strong and robust to alternative measures, samples, and model specifications. After establishing this baseline result, we use a finite mixture model to estimate the relative weight accorded to security ties versus trade ties. This novel application of the mixture model allows us to estimate *when* and *how often* states exploit accession for geopolitical purposes. We find that geopolitical alignment motivates nearly half of the membership decisions in our sample of 157 states and 252 multilateral economic organizations over the period 1949-2014.

Our findings contribute new insights to research about the security basis for economic cooperation (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Blanchard, Mansfield and Ripsman, 2000; Lake, 2009). First, security linkages extend beyond bilateral exchanges of trade and aid. Second, they are not limited to the Cold War period of bipolar distribution of power. Third, they form a significant factor in membership decisions for a large number of organizations and countries. To the extent that geopolitical bias in the selection of members supports the willingness of states to share mutual gains, it represents a critical dimension of international cooperation (Keohane, 1986; Powell, 1991; Baldwin, 1993).

Our results also present evidence of the selection bias that confronts research on the effectiveness of international institutions; the decision to join IGOs is endogenous to state preferences (e.g. Martin and Simmons, 1998). Skeptics have long claimed that ex ante power and interests make regimes "epiphenomenal" and cooperation shallow (Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). We demonstrate that non-random selection occurs through screening members on the basis of geopolitical relations. This result is mixed news for advocates of multilateral institutions. On the one hand, the politicization of membership offers a rebuttal to those who dismiss compliance as the result of screening for compliant states. On the other hand, research about how joint IGO membership encourages peace needs to account for the role of geopolitical alignment as a determinant of IGO membership.

The next section reviews existing theoretical perspectives on IGO membership. Section 3 explains our argument about the role of geopolitical alignment as a force of attraction driving membership decisions. We specify observable implications to assess the theory's predictions for patterns of membership. Then we introduce our data on economic IGOs and present the results of our empirical analysis of membership in section 4. A final section concludes.

2 IGO Membership

There is wide variation in the membership of international organizations, both in terms of the number and type of states that join. Founding members may coalesce from a group based on narrowly defined interests or come together as a loose amalgamation of diverse states. These governments often grant themselves discretion about membership when they design international organizations. Vague membership rules and subjective policy evaluations enable members to strategically admit additional states while excluding others. Consequently, organizations that appear to be technocratic show considerable variation — commodity organizations can include both producers and consumers, such as the International Cotton Advisory Committee, or focus exclusively on dominant producers, such as OPEC. Geographic restrictions can evolve, with regional organizations expanding and in some cases including non-regional members.[1] The required level of policy reform may differ by applicant. For example, several European states joined the Asian Development Bank as extra-regional members, and Japan joined the International Cotton Advisory Committee without being a producer. WTO members determined that Afghanistan could enter WTO while Iran remains subject to policy reviews that continue to hold up its entry. Even when organizations impose no membership restrictions, not all states choose to join.

Keohane (1984) argues that demand for international institutions arises from their ability to resolve market failures. In his theory, international organizations help states reduce transaction costs and overcome information problems. This implies we should observe a membership selection process based on common interests within the issue area regulated by the institution.Others argue that democracy and democratic transitions increase demand for IGOs as a means to credibly commit to policy reforms (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, 2016).

Scholars focusing on the optimal size of IGOs contend that states structure membership to address enforcement concerns and the distribution of gains from cooperation (e.g. Martin, 1992; Kahler, 1992; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001; Drezner, 2007; Koremenos, 2016). The trade-off between depth of rules and breadth of participation generates conflicting incentives for the ideal membership size of institutions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p. 796). A small group with similar preferences can more

[1] For evidence that IGO membership patterns have become less regional over time, see (Greenhill and Lupu, 2017).

readily reach agreements and monitor compliance but a larger group offers more benefits (Kahler, 1992; Downs and Rocke, 1995; Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008; Thompson and Verdier, 2014). In some cases, small groups set the rules and gradually expand to admit new members as their preferences converge (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1998; Jupille, Mattli and Snidal, 2013; Gray, Lindstadt and Slapin, Forthcoming). In other cases, states allocate different levels of decision authority across members (Gilligan, 2004; Stone, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2015). For these studies of institutional design, interests regulated by the regime determine the scope of membership.

Alongside their role in solving market failures within a given issue area, international institutions can also serve as a forum for states to advance their foreign policy goals through economic statecraft. Scholars have shown that alliances shape trade flows (Gowa, 1994; Long and Leeds, 2006), and other sources of influence can skew trade toward states with good relations (Berger et al., 2013; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). States allocate foreign aid with attention to strategic interests (Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Bermeo, 2018). Do these same forces that shape bilateral flows influence decisions regarding multilateral cooperation? Some research suggests that multilateral regimes dilute such politics to neutralize the influence of foreign relations (Carnegie, 2014; Milner and Tingley, 2013). Yet evidence of horse-trading within multilateral fora is widespread (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Lim and Vreeland, 2013).

The role of political relations suggests new variables that shape IGO membership. In discriminatory clubs, actors select members on the basis of certain attributes that are distinct from their contribution to effective regulation.[2] Membership reflects both the ability to contribute to the joint project and an intrinsic value to the group. Several empirical studies of IGO membership suggest patterns of discrimination. For example, states screen out others seen to represent a security risk or those that differ in their regime

[2]For discriminatory club good theory, see (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 385). This contrasts with modeling cooperation among anonymous states based on their relative size (e.g. Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008)

type (Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2014; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, 2016). Looking at the trade regime, Davis and Wilf (2017) find evidence that geopolitical alignment shapes both applications to join and accession negotiations. States are also more likely to cooperate with partners with whom they are linked in existing networks of agreements (Kinne, 2013). From this perspective, the appeal of joining an IGO depends on the composition of its members and not just mutual interests on a narrow issue.

3 Geopolitical Alignment as Basis for IGO Membership

Security ties affect the probability of cooperation in at least two ways: security externalities and security linkages. In the first, cooperation on economic issues generates spillovers in the security realm. States recognize that the efficiency gains from international cooperation can be channeled into military power (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994), so they steer cooperation toward perceived allies. Both leaders and the general public believe that it will be safer to support cooperation with allies and exclude rivals (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2017).

There are limitations, however, to explanations based on security externalities. This logic largely applies to the bipolar era of clearly divided alliance structures and bilateral settings where individual states control the flow of material benefits (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).[3] But the end of the Cold War coincided with a surge of economic cooperation and an expanding scope for multilateral rules to govern these exchanges. Moreover, if states gain positive utility from augmenting the capability of allies, they should demand full compliance with an institution's rules in order to maximize income gains. In practice, however, existing members often relax rules to facilitate the entry of their geopolitical allies. For example, the United States encouraged other GATT members to allow Japan to enter the trade regime without requiring the removal of substantial trade barriers, and it advocated admitting Korea to the OECD de-

[3] Indeed, multilateral trade negotiations relied on bilateral deals based on the principal- supplier rule to isolate the exchange of benefits (Hicks and Gowa, Forthcoming).

spite reservations by Korea to limit its financial liberalization. These observations suggest that a second mechanism may drive the correlation between geopolitical alignment and IGO membership.

3.1 Linkage: Favoring Friends and Excluding Rivals

In addition to the security externality logic, institutions facilitate resource transfers as part of a linkage strategy. Different preferences for security and economic cooperation underlie this strategy.[4] For one state, economic gains motivate accession, while for another state, enhanced leverage on security matters justify the economic exchange. The institutional context strengthens the linkage by providing an exclusion mechanism that restricts cooperation to the subset of members and increases the credibility of promised benefits to recipients.

Because IGOs limit discrimination among members once they are admitted to the organization, linkage politics is concentrated in the accession phase. The accession process of multilateral institutions can vary from the deposit of a ratification instrument to a rigorous review and vote by current members.[5] Upon accession, members hold rights to participate in decision-making and obligations to contribute to joint projects. Most importantly, membership demarcates boundaries for the distribution of benefits achieved through cooperation.[6] In economic organizations, for example, direct benefits include preferential market access, coordination on regulatory standards, or financial assistance. In addition, closer association with a particular group of states through joint membership confers reputation benefits as states improve their standing in the eyes of investors or gain credibility vis a vis hostile states (Kydd, 2001; Gray, 2013; Brooks, Cunha and Mosley, 2014; Gray and Hicks, 2014).

There are two levels whereby IGO accession facilitates security linkages. First, preferential entry

[4]See (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Davis, 2004; Poast, 2013).

[5]Most institutions adopt a unanimity rule to approve entry by new states (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012).

[6]As distinct from public goods, club goods allow for possibility of exclusion through limiting benefits to those who contribute to the provision of the club good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).

into an IGO for allies provides shared access to the benefits of membership. Even organizations that aspire to universal scope require approval of members, which opens the possibility for discrimination. For example, entry into GATT was easier for Japan than China, most IGOs refuse to admit Taiwan, and the Universal Postal Union expelled South Africa in opposition to apartheid. The terms of entry also vary across states. Given the discretion over who joins, states can inject political relations as a criteria to favor friends. Once a state joins, it continues to draw on member benefits going forward without having to engage in repeated negotiations over access.

Second, after accession, states distribute favors through the IGO as side payments. A wide literature analyzes the use of IGOs to allocate side payments. Some show that international financial institutions provide more generous terms to strategic partners (Thacker, 1999; Stone, 2008; Dreher et al., 2013). The United States applied the principal-supplier rule of the GATT such that the largest trade gains in the regime would accrue to its closest allies (Gowa and Kim, 2005). Joint membership also facilitates issue linkages that reward cooperation outside of the institution. For example, temporary members of the UN Security Council receive more aid through UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Mikulaschek, Forthcoming). Such deals shift the level of benefits among members, but within a smaller range than the gap between member and non-member states.

While linkages also occur through bilateral channels, multilateral institutions hold distinct advantages. The international institution supports burden-sharing across a larger group of states. It also offers political cover when the exchange relationship may arouse controversy at home or vis-a-vis other countries. By acting within the multilateral context, states "launder" their influence attempts (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, pp. 18).

Across these linkage strategies, states balance commitment and control. Membership promises an ongoing stream of benefits. Powerful states want to bring into IGOs those states who are most in need of side payments as part of long term relations of exchange (Lake, 2009). Although states could be expelled, multilateral decision processes raise a barrier that limits such extreme sanctions. In this way, IGO membership adds credibility to the commitment by one state to share benefits with another. At the same time, side payments offer flexibility for short-term demands. When a priority looms large for a powerful member, it can shift the allocation of benefits to serve its goals (Stone, 2011).

Linkage policies within economic institutions strengthen security coalitions. Allies may use policy coordination outside of defense policies as one way to signal intentions and create a credible alliance commitment (Morrow, 2000). Supporting the entry of a security partner into multilateral institutions is difficult to reverse, especially relative to annual trade or aid flows. Any costs from letting in states that may not otherwise be optimal partners for economic cooperation are justified by the added credibility for their alliance. For example, Turkey's membership in the OECD introduced greater heterogeneity among members' business practices and yet was worthwhile for the positive security signal attained through such cooperation. Easy entry is a form of patronage to favor allies or bribery to gain leverage over critical swing states in a broad security coalition. Evidence suggests the strategy works: Henke (2017) shows that diplomatic ties have a positive effect on formation of multilateral military coalitions, and Poast (2013) finds that linking alliance ties with trade provisions increases alliance performance.

The flip side of favoritism for friends is the exclusion of rivals. This denies the benefits of the organization to rival states while holding out entry as a carrot to induce improved behavior. For example, China was close to having GATT accession approved when the Tiananmen massacre led to the suspension of negotiations. Similarly, the United States has wielded its veto over Iranian accession to the WTO as a bargaining chip in negotiations over its nuclear weapons program (Davis and Wilf, 2017). Russia's accession talks with the OECD were put on hold in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Once allowed into the organization, such leverage is severely diminished (Carnegie, 2014).

Our argument differs from issue linkage in functional regime theory because security interests lie outside regime jurisdiction. States may accept lower regime effectiveness for the sake of extra-regime cooperation benefits. Those who cooperate on security matters are the most willing to engage together on other tasks such as regulating tariffs and coordinating foreign aid.

3.2 Testable Implications for Membership Patterns

To test our theory of IGO membership, we examine whether states with shared geopolitical alignment are more likely to join the same organizations. Our research design uses observational data about state behavior, making it hard to infer causality. dUsing multiple measures of geopolitical alignment and exploring alternative model specifications reduces the risk of a spurious finding.

We compare the role of geopolitical alignment with the functional demand for membership based on interests within the issue area regulated by the IGO. Since geopolitical alignment and interests within the issue area overlap entirely in the area of security organizations, looking outside security organizations provides a better test. In economic organizations, one can compare how geopolitical alignment contributes to demand for membership relative to the impact of economic interests.

We define geopolitical alignment as the common foreign policy interest of states. Shared alliances are our primary operationalization of the concept, and in addition, we analyze similarity of alliance portfolios and UN voting patterns. We also examine conditions that influence the importance of security interests. First, we distinguish between geopolitical alignment with all members of international organizations versus the most powerful member states. In principle, any existing member state can link accession of potential members to shared security interests. Below, we measure a state's geopolitical ties with all IGO members to assess how comprehensively the state shares foreign policy interests with existing members.

Then we separately measure a state's ties with powerful states, who are the most likely to engage in linkage strategies as they cement relationships with strategic partners.

Second, we analyze whether the role of geopolitical alignment differs over the lifespan of an IGO. Establishing an IGO raises transaction costs as states negotiate the IGO charter and set up a headquarters and financial base. While states may use security linkages to overcome the initial cooperation challenges, they could focus strictly on policy when establishing the rules of the game and only later politicize membership. Looking separately at each stage, we test how geopolitics shapes membership at founding and enlargement.

4 Empirical Analysis of IGO Membership Patterns

Our empirical tests have two primary objectives. First, we estimate the effect of geopolitical alignment on the probability of IGO membership in a series of regression models, controlling for functional economic interests. Second, we estimate the relative weight given to geopolitical and functional considerations. We fit a finite mixture model to the IGO membership data in order to assess which observations are more consistent with geopolitics or economics, and to show the conditions under which states privilege one over the other.

4.1 Data

We analyze a sample of 252 economic IGOs for the period from 1949 to 2014.[7] Starting with the 534 IGOs in version 3.0 of the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004), we identify 399 with an economic focus based on information from the Yearbook of International Organizations and the charter document that establishes each organization.

[7] Economic topics are broadly construed to include aid, finance, trade, and more general management of resources, travel, and standards relevant for economic exchange.

Of these organizations, 252 have publicly available formal charters that enable us to collect data on the organization's geographic scope and membership restrictions. These IGOs form the primary sample we use in the empirical analysis.[8]

We conduct our analysis at the level of the state-IGO-year (Poast and Urpelainen, 2013; Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2014). This unit of observation reflects the decision process we seek to model: when a state elects to join an IGO, it considers a specific organization and its existing member states. Our sample consists of all state-IGO-year pairings for 157 states in the 252 economic IGOs from 1949-2014.[9] The dependent variable, *IGO Membership*$_{ijt}$, is a dichotomous measure of whether state *i* is a member of organization *j* in year *t*. *IGO Membership* is equal to 1 in 37.5% of the 1.18 million observations. In the tests below, we also subset this sample to assess whether geopolitical alignment has different effects on joining as a founding member, joining later as by accession, or exiting the organization.[10]

Formal alliances are our primary measure of geopolitical alignment.[11] The variable *Average Alliances*$_{ijt}$ measures the proportion of IGO *j*'s member states with which state *i* shares a formal alliance in a given year. In the sample, it ranges from 0 (64.1% of observations) to 1 (2.7% of observations) with a mean value of 0.10. Second, *Lead State Alliance*$_{ijt}$ indicates whether state *i* shares an alliance with the leading economic power among member states of IGO *j* during year *t*, with economic power measured annually by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In our sample, states are allied with an IGO's most powerful member state in 16.9% of state-IGO-years.

We also analyze two alternative measures of geopolitical alignment. *S-scores* is a continuous measure of similarity across states' entire portfolio of alliances; it reaches its maximum (1) when two states have

[8] Results are not contingent on our exclusion of IGOs without charter documents.

[9] IGOs enter the dataset in the year in which they are founded and continue until 2014 or the organization ends. We include all states listed in the COW state system for which we have data on covariates. Covariate coverage primarily excludes small states (e.g., Grenada, Monaco, Brunei) or those where data is unavailable (North Korea).

[10] Donno, Metzger and Russett (2014) focus their analysis of IGO accession on the enlargement phase, and Poast and Urpelainen (2013) demonstrate that the politics of forming new IGOs differs from joining existing IGOs.

[11] Data on alliances comes from version 4.1 of the COW Formal Alliances dataset (Gibler, 2009).

identical alliance portfolios.[12] *UN Ideal Point Similarity* is a continuous variable that increases as the UN voting records of two states converge (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). This measure offers a broader perspective on the foreign policy orientation of states across a range of topics on the international agenda and has been widely used in the literature to measure geopolitical alignment (e.g. Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Each alternative measure is operationalized to create both an "average" and "lead state" variable.

Trade with IGO members and trade with the IGO lead state measure the impact of shared economic ties.[13] We include monadic variables for income (GDP per capita, logged), market size (GDP, logged), and trade openness (total trade / GDP). Conditioning on these economic variables addresses the possibility that economic flows and security interests are jointly determined.

We control for additional variables that may influence state demand to join IGOs and the willingness of members to accept their entry. Polity scores capture the tendency of democratic states to join and form IGOs with higher frequency (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015). We account for the possibility that IGOs screen out conflict-prone states (Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2014) by including a variable measuring the average number of fatal militarized disputes (MIDs) between state i and members of IGO j.[14] To address potential diffusion effects, the variable *Total IGO Membership* is a count of members in each IGO, which could exert positive attraction for other states to enter. Since the behavior of neighbors may exert stronger influence over states, we also include a variable for *Members from Region* indicating the number of states residing in state i's geographic region that are members of IGO j. Separate control variables measure shared colonial history as well as a state's average geographic

[12] S-scores are calculated using the COW formal alliance dataset.

[13] Bilateral trade data is from the IMF Direction of Trade dataset. The "trade with members" variable measures average (logged) volume of imports and exports between state i and each member of IGO j. The "trade with lead state" variable measures (logged) trade volume with the lead state. We add one before taking the log to ensure values of zero trade are not excluded due to the mathematical transformation.

[14] MIDs data are from the dyadic version of the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset .

distance from IGO *j*'s member states.[15]

Finally, the design of the IGO influences its openness to new members. An indicator for *Universal IGO* identifies organizations without any formal restrictions on membership eligibility. Nine percent of IGOs in our sample either advocate universal membership or do not include formal restrictions. The remaining organizations are selective through a negotiated terms of accession or specific limits on eligibility such as commodity production, culture, or region.[16] We account for geographic restrictions via an indicator for regional organizations, and another for whether a state belongs to the specific region of the IGO.[17] The variable *State-IGO Same Region* addresses the likelihood that regional IGOs accept members from their region at a higher rate than other states.[18] Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we model time dependence by incorporating a cubic polynomial for *t* in all models, and an indicator for the Cold War period (1947-1991) adjusts for baseline differences in membership rates during the bipolar era.

4.2 Logistic Regression Models

We first use a logistic regression model to predict the dichotomous outcome variable, IGO membership. Independent variables are lagged by one year, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. We estimate the following model of IGO membership for state *i* in IGO *j* and year *t*:

$$\Pr(\text{IGO membership}_{ijt} = 1) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 X_{ijt-1})$$

The model predicts IGO membership using our primary operationalization of geopolitical alignment, formal alliances. All models include a set of control variables X_{ijt}, which are measured at the level of the state-IGO-year (e.g., Trade and fatal MIDs with IGO Members); state-IGO (State-IGO Same Region),

[15]Data on geographic distance and colonial linkages are from CEPII.

[16]This variable was coded from IGO treaty documents.

[17]State regions are coded using the World Bank's "country and lending groups" classification scheme (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups). IGOs are coded as regional if their IGO charter or organizational title references a geographic region.

[18]Several IGOs are regional in scope of work but allow states outside of the region to become members.

state (Trade Openness, GDP, GDP per capita, Polity); and IGO (Universal Membership, Regional IGO).

We begin with a set of models using the *Average Alliances* measure of geopolitical alignment. Table 1 displays results for a reduced form specification (Model 1) and a full model with all control variables (Model 2). In these first specifications, we assess membership in the broadest sense, including states' entry into an IGO and each year of continued membership.[19] The results support our primary hypothesis: as states share more alliances with an IGO's member states, they are significantly more likely to join the organization. In the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the *Average Alliances* measure increases the probability of membership, on average, from 23 to 26%. The relationship holds when controlling for functional economic interest (measured by trade with IGO members), which also has a positive and significant association with IGO membership.

Model 3 examines state entry into IGOs. This sample omits the years after a state has joined an organization, acknowledging that they rarely reevaluate membership decisions in any given year. Both geopolitical alignment and trade ties have a strong, positive association with entry. Models 4-6 analyze how linkage politics shape IGO membership at different stages in the evolution of a regime. Model 4 examines membership patterns in the year of IGO *formation*.[20] Model 5 examines state entry by accession in the years after the IGO is created.[21] Model 6 reverses the membership question to analyze exit from IGOs.[22] Results are consistent with a strong effect of shared security interests on IGO membership, formation, and accession. In both periods of organizational creation and expansion, geopolitical alignment with IGO members has a significant association with entry. The coefficient on the *Average*

[19]This is consistent with Stone (2011), who theorizes participation in IGOs as an ongoing process of decisions to enter and continue cooperation.

[20]Excludes observations before and after the formation year yields a smaller sample. Forty-nine IGOs are created before 1950 and drop from the sample.

[21]As in model 3, this specification also excludes observations after a state has joined an IGO.

[22]The exit model evaluates when members leave an organization. Observations enter the sample once a state joins an IGO and remain until the state exits or the IGO ceases to exist. We use rare events logit because instances of exit are very infrequent (0.11% of observations).

Alliances variable is larger in the formation stage, offering some evidence that geopolitics are relatively more important when IGO is first created. Shared alliances do not significantly affect the likelihood of a state exiting IGOs (Model 6).

Model 7 re-estimates the entry model with a fixed effect for state-IGO pairs, addressing unobserved heterogeneity unique to each state and IGO that influence the likelihood of membership. The control variables that do not vary over time or country are dropped in this specification. The estimated effect of geopolitical alignment is even stronger. Functional economic interest, as measured by trade with IGO members, also has a positive and statistically significant association with IGO membership. The final column (Model 8) uses a difference-in-differences specification to examine how changes in geopolitical alignment influence shifts in IGO membership among state-IGO pairs.[23] The coefficient estimates suggest a strong effect of geopolitical alignment: a one standard deviation shift in *Average Alliances* increases the probability of membership by 6.65%.

[23] Following Lechner (2011), we use a linear probability model for the difference-in-differences specification. We remove the "Cold War" indicator in this specification, since the model includes fixed effects for each year.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Baseline	Full	Entry	Formation	Expansion	Exit	State-IGO FE	Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.001***	2.106***	1.324***	1.608***	1.341***	−0.070	2.572***	0.303***
	(0.127)	(0.192)	(0.442)	(0.158)	(0.370)	(0.243)	(0.307)	(0.024)
Trade with Members	0.282***	0.359***	0.263***	0.213***	0.336***	−0.054*	0.065***	0.005***
	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Polity	−0.004	0.012*	0.014	0.016**	0.013	−0.006	0.066***	0.001***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.0004)
GDP	−0.176***	0.051	0.018	−0.171***	0.005	0.029	0.420***	0.017***
	(0.018)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.030)	(0.097)	(0.052)	(0.113)	(0.003)
GDP per capita		−0.210***	−0.018	−0.047**	−0.036	0.166	−0.411	−0.003
		(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.003)
Trade Openness		−0.019**	−0.055**	−0.112**	−0.066**	−0.019	0.002	−0.0002*
		(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.0001)
Universal IGO		0.151**	1.104***	−0.163*	1.235***	−0.213		0.029***
		(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.142)		(0.008)
Regional IGO		−1.234***	-2.136***	−2.470***	−2.010***	−1.510***		−0.051***
		(0.111)	(0.159)	(0.128)	(0.190)	(0.010)		(0.007)
Cold War		−0.066*	−0.213***	−0.198**	−0.169**	−0.529***	−0.274**	
		(0.038)	(0.061)	(0.101)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.107)	
Observations	1,176,069	1,176,069	912,049	18,723	893,332	285,177	912,049	1,176,069
# IGOs	252	252	252	203	252	249	252	252
# States	157	157	157	155	156	157	157	157

Table 1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in salient, economic IGOs. Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 2-6 include the following controls (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

In Figure 1, we compare the effect of *Average Alliances* with the effect of holding an alliance with the lead state of an IGO. Geopolitical alignment with an organization's most powerful member state has a significantly larger effect. Shifting the *Average Alliances* variable by one standard deviation above the mean (from .095 to .315) increases the probability of IGO membership, on average, by more than 3 percentage points. Moving the *Lead State Alliance* variable from 0 to 1 increases the probability of membership by more than 7 percentage points, equivalent to adding an alliance with 50% of other IGO members. These are substantial effects, given a baseline membership rate of only 24%. This finding is consistent with the importance of ties with patron states that exercise influence over the organization.

Figure 1 also shows consistent results for the alternative measures of geopolitical alignment (*S-scores* and *UN Ideal Point similarity*). Trade with IGO members is included for comparison. In every case, geopolitical alignment has a positive and statistically significant effect on IGO membership. The alternative measures, however, do not show a similar gap between the average and lead state operationalizations.

Figure A1 in the appendix shows the effect of *Average Alliances* across different samples of economic IGOs. We subset the sample to 89 highly "salient" organizations where significant stakes offer the potential for meaningful side payments.[24] The effect of alliances with IGO members increases slightly in the salient sample. We also compare regional vs. non-regional organizations and find that the effect of geopolitical alignment is notably larger in non-regional organizations. The broader pool of potential members for these IGOs may facilitate the use of geopolitical alignment as a membership criterion. Finally, we find a smaller effect in the sample of salient and universal organizations where membership is less open to power politics.

We also compare the effect of geopolitical alignment across issue areas (see appendix Figure A2).

[24] We define as salient any IGO which received at least 50 references in major newspapers (i.e., those included in the Lexis-Nexis database) in the year of its founding or the year 2014 when our sample ends.



Figure 1: *Substantive Effect of Geopolitical Alignment*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting a variable of interest. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 bootstrapped simulations of the full model (Model 2).

As expected, security-oriented IGOs feature the strongest association between alliance patterns and institutional membership. Compared to economic IGOs, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the average alliance measure is approximately twice as large in security organizations. Geopolitical alignment exhibits the smallest pull in decisions to join environmental IGOs. The ordering across these issue areas supports the logic that states use the institutional venue for building a security coalition, whether directly coordinating security policies or drawing on economic benefits. Environmental organizations that regulate by restricting harmful policies for the sake of public goods provision offer fewer opportunities for side payments to allies.

To address concerns about endogeneity between alliances and IGO membership, we examine whether *sudden reversals* in states' geopolitical orientation has an impact on IGO membership. In cases where states experience sharp breaks in their alliance patterns — defined as changing at least ten alliances in a given year (e.g., Cuba following the 1959 Revolution) — we ask whether they are more likely to enter organizations with their new alliance partners and exit IGOs populated by former allies. Table 2 shows that both entry and exit behavior show a significant correlation with states' new geopolitical orientation. Column 1 shows that states are significantly more likely to enter organizations with their new allies following a shift in geopolitical orientation. In Column 2, we see that sudden reversals in geopolitical alignment also affect the probability of exit. States are less likely to exit organizations with new allies, and more likely to exit organizations populated by their former security partners.

As a robustness test, we add a control for states' incoming and outgoing flows of foreign direct investment to capture demand for economic cooperation beyond trade. In addition, we estimate a model with separate coefficients for geopolitical alignment in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In all cases, shared security interests exert a strong influence on IGO membership. Results are also robust to the use of defense pacts instead of all alliances, exclusion of NATO members, the exclusion of eight economic IGOs that serve as alliances (e.g. Commonwealth of Independent States), the addition of a control for states' total alliance memberships, geographic distance between a state and existing members of an IGO, and a lagged dependent variable. Finally, we fit a Cox proportional hazards model to test whether geopolitical alignment influences states' time to entry for each IGO. See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for these results.

4.3 Finite Mixture Model

We have seen that across a large sample of economic institutions, geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of IGO membership. This is important evidence for the effect of geopolitical alignment, but

	(1) Entry	(2) Exit
New Alliance with Members	0.260*	−0.544*
	(0.142)	(0.293)
Dropped Alliance with Members	0.049	1.915***
	(0.0.141)	(0.444)
Trade with Members	0.124***	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.047)
Polity	0.014	−0.088***
	(0.016)	(0.030)
GDP	−0.080	0.244*
	(0.080)	(0.127)
GDP per capita	0.413***	−0.180
	(0.137)	(0.258)
Trade Openness	−0.260**	0.108
	(0.104)	(0.249)
Universal IGO	0.740***	−0.163
	(0.164)	(0.388)
Regional IGO	−1.862***	−1.118
	(0.245)	(0.1.118)
Cold War	−1.918***	−2.930**
	(0.522)	(1.241)
Observations	64,283	19,698
# IGOs	251	199
# States	72	72

Table 2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Sudden Reversals in Geopolitical Orientation*. These models examine cases where states experience sharp breaks in geopolitical alignment, defined as adding or dropping at least ten alliances in a given year. The models test whether adding or dropping alliances with IGO members during sudden reversals of geopolitical orientation affects the probability of entry (Model 1) and exit (Model 2). The sample includes the five year span after a state experiences a sharp break in geopolitical alignment. Models include all control variables used in Table 1, Column 2. Statistical significance is denoted by: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

leaves two additional questions unanswered. First, how powerful is our hypothesized geopolitical model compared to the functional economic explanation? Second, under what conditions do states privilege geopolitical considerations over economic interests? To answer these questions, we estimate a finite mixture model. The mixture model allows for multiple distinct theoretical processes to drive outcomes. As Imai and Tingley (2012, p. 218) explain, "each observation is assumed to be generated either from a statistical model implied by one of the rival theories or more generally from a weighted combination of multiple statistical models under consideration." In a single framework, researchers can judge the relative explanatory power of competing theories.

In our case, we hypothesize that some membership decisions are consistent with the geopolitical alignment logic and others are consistent with a functional explanation. The analysis assumes a data generating process that assigns each observation to a probability distribution over the two competing models. For example, an observation may have a 25% likelihood of assignment to the geopolitical model, and a 75% likelihood for the functional economic model.[25] This assignment stage is guided by a set of *model-predicting* variables which help determine which model is most appropriate. For state *i* and IGO *j* in year *t*, the probability of assignment to the geopolitical model (π_G) is:

$$\pi_{G,ijt} \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\delta + \delta_1 \text{Cold War}_t + \delta_2 \text{Polity}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 \text{Universal}_j)$$

The *model-predicting* variables are akin to scope conditions, informing the relative applicability of each competing model. These variables are measured at different levels of analysis, matching the multilevel nature of our state-IGO-year sample. The first is an indicator for the Cold War period, reflecting the realist expectation that geopolitical considerations will be strongest when the distribution of power is characterized by bipolarity.The second is a measure of domestic regime type (Polity scores), capturing

[25]See Figure A3 in the Appendix for the distribution of model assignments in the fitted model.

the liberal notion that the structure of state-society relations shapes foreign policy decisions.Third, we include the indicator for whether an IGO's charter contains a provision for limiting membership or aims to achieve universal membership.[26]

For each observation, the outcome (IGO Membership) is generated via a weighted combination of the geopolitical and functional economic models.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Geopolitical: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) &= logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_3 D_{ijt-1}) \\ \text{Economic: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) &= logit^{-1}(\alpha_2 + \delta_1 \text{Trade}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 D_{ijt-1})\end{aligned}$$

We specify the geopolitical model using the *Average Alliances* variable and the control variables included in the full model from Table 1 (Column 2) while excluding the measure of trade ties. The functional economic model excludes the alliances variable and instead includes *Trade with Members*.[27] These specifications make it possible to identify a "geopolitical" and "economic" model *a priori*.

We first provide results for the two competing models — geopolitics versus functional economic preferences — that drive patterns of state membership in economic IGOs. Table 3 displays coefficient estimates from the geopolitical (Column 1) and economic (Column 2) components of the mixture model, as well as a pooled model of IGO membership formation for comparison (Column 3).[28]

In the geopolitical model, the estimated effect of *Average Alliances* is nearly twice as large as the original pooled estimate (shown in Column 3). A one standard deviation (0.22) increase in the *Average Alliances* variable is associated with a 5.53% increase in the probability of IGO membership, and the shift from no alliance with a lead state to holding such an alliance is associated with a 8.76% increase in the

[26] Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) contend that IGOs limit membership to address enforcement or uncertainty about preferences.

[27] Though both models include the same control variables, the coefficients are allowed to vary across the two theories.

[28] The model is estimated using the *flexmix* package in R (Grun and Leisch, 2008). Coefficients and standard errors are obtained by estimating a weighted logistic regression, with weights corresponding to each observation's assignment to the two competing models.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Average Alliances	4.307***		2.106***
	(0.173)		(0.192)
Trade with Members		0.987***	0.359***
		(0.038)	(0.040)
Polity	−0.026***	0.022***	0.012*
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
GDP	0.222***	−0.170***	0.051
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.064)
GDP per capita	−0.141***	−0.387***	−0.210***
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Trade Openness	0.019***	−0.264***	−0.019**
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Universal IGO	0.489***	0.098	0.151**
	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.064)
Regional IGO	−2.258***	−0.801***	−1.234***
	(0.153)	(0.124)	(0.111)
Fatal MIDs with Members	3.626**	2.624***	1.028***
	(1.666)	(0.277)	(0.228)
Existing Members from Region	0.089***	0.487***	0.156***
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Cold War	−0.156***	−0.144***	−0.066*
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Observations	564,279	611,800	1,176,079

Table 3: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models.* Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2). Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

probability of IGO membership (see table A3 for lead state results). The larger effect suggests that among the observations identified by the model as consistent with a geopolitical logic, security relationships have a very powerful influence on IGO membership decisions. The key independent variable in the economic model, *Trade with Members*, is similarly larger in magnitude than in the pooled model.[29] Some control variables have different effects across the two models. States with higher polity scores tend to join fewer IGOs among observations consistent with the geopolitical model, but joint IGOs at a higher rate in the economic model. GDP and trade openness also have contrasting effects. IGOs with universal membership eligibility have significantly higher rates of state membership only among observations driven by the geopolitical model.

The mixture model allows us to compare the total explanatory power of each competing theory in the sample. In our case, the model estimates that the geopolitical explanation is nearly as powerful as the functional model in explaining membership in economic institutions: approximately 48.4% of observations in the sample are consistent with the geopolitical model, while the remaining 51.6% are more accurately explained by the functional economic model.[30] This is notable given that the sample is constructed only of economic institutions. When we measure trade and alliances with the lead state in an IGO, the mixture model assigns an even greater proportion of observations to the geopolitical model, with 59.9% of membership decisions driven by geopolitics (see Table A3 in the Appendix).

Because each observation is assigned to a weighted combination of the competing geopolitical and economic models, we can assess the conditions under which the geopolitical logic dominates functional economic considerations. Figure 2 demonstrates that as the Cold War progressed, states put a greater emphasis on geopolitics in their IGO membership decisions. This trend declined slightly in the waning

[29] Increasing *Trade with Members* by one standard deviation (6.09) is associated with a 10.30% increase in the probability of IGO membership.

[30] We calculate this measure by summing over all observations' probability of assignment to Model 1 and Model 2.



Figure 2: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for each year in the sample.

years of the Cold War before increasing sharply as the fall of the Iron Curtain shifted states' geopolitical orientations. Although the tendency to incorporate geopolitics into membership decisions has declined in the post-Cold War era, states still emphasize geopolitical considerations approximately 48% of the time. This evidence counters the view that Cold War bipolarity is necessary for security to shape membership decisions.

Examination of specific institutions can assess how rule changes impact the conditions of membership. Figure 3 displays results for the trade regime, which broadened its scope of rules with the change from the GATT to the WTO in 1995. The average geopolitical orientation of states considering joining the GATT was high among IGOs at 0.49, while the assignment of geopolitical observations to the WTO



Figure 3: *GATT-WTO Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for the GATT and WTO. The line demarcates the institutional change from GATT to WTO in 1995.

was slightly lower (0.48). Consistent with the analysis of Davis and Wilf (2017), the end of Cold War and institutional reforms at this time led to a smaller effect of geopolitical alignment on membership decisions without eliminating its importance.

We can similarly compare the power of the geopolitical and functional economic models across a range of other dimensions (See figure 4 and Table A4 in the Appendix). Democratic states appear to be less geopolitical in their approach to IGO membership. Approximately 38% of state-IGO-year observations with democratic countries are consistent with the geopolitical model. Among non-democracies, 55% of observations are driven primarily by geopolitical alignment.

Finally, the mixture model can track changes in particular states' IGO membership behavior. Figures A4-A8 in the Appendix demonstrate how Russia, Iran, China, the United States, and Japan have shifted



Figure 4: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples and Measures*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model. Each barplot represents a different sample for the specified subset of observations. The left graph uses the average state alliance measure, and the right graph shows estimates from the lead state alliance measure.

over time in the attention each state devotes to geopolitical considerations when making institutional membership choices. Notably, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the outward turn of China starting in the 1970s correspond with less weight given to geopolitics even as they remain higher than the United States. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within, vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded.

5 Concluding remarks

This paper demonstrates that geopolitical alignment increases the probability that states will be members of the same international economic institutions. This relationship holds both when institutions form and when they expand. An analysis in a mixture model reveals that about half of the observations of state membership in economic IGOs are better explained by a geopolitical model than the by the economic ties that dominate in a market failure account of cooperation. States weigh both security and economic interests when making decisions about multilateral economic cooperation, and our evidence indicates that in many cases the former loom larger than the latter.

In our theory, states use multilateral venues as a tool of economic statecraft. By linking security ties within multilateral economic institutions, states bolster their security coalitions. The strong effect of security ties with the most powerful member state underscores the patronage role of IGO membership. Our argument challenges institutionalist theories by introducing a different source of demand for institutions. This opens the possibility for more impact by the institution on state behavior because entry is not simply derivative to states' policy interest in the issue area. States that join for other reasons related to foreign policy are susceptible to pressure to reform policies.

Yet subordinating institutional participation choices to security interests could also undercut institutional effectiveness. Others have shown that the allocation of loans by international financial institutions is conditional on geopolitical interests (e.g. Thacker, 1999; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Our findings highlight broader discrimination that begins at accession. Just as political allocation undermines the efficacy of foreign aid (Dreher et al., 2013), the geopolitics of IGO membership may distort the credibility of institutional commitments. As security ties take precedence over policy reform, compliance levels are likely to worsen. This in turn creates pressures for institutional proliferation if states build new institutions to address the shortcomings of existing IGOs and forge new ties.

The foreign policy role of IGOs should shape how scholars assess institutional effectiveness. Evaluating outcomes based on policy reforms within the issue area neglects the foreign policy benefits of membership. Identifying a causal relationship between institutions and peace becomes even more difficult, however, in light of the geopolitical bias in membership. To the extent that states join IGOs because they already have common security interests, a spurious relationship could generate the observed correlation between IGO membership and peace.

The question of why and how states cooperate is fundamentally connected to the question of *who* states choose as partners for cooperation. Joining an institution is not the same as signing a contract with an anonymous actor. In the small community of states, political relations provide a rich context as both sources of information and mutual interests. Against this backdrop, states form club-style IGOs that favor entry by friends and exclude rivals.

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6 Appendix



Figure A1: *Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Alliances with Members variable from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2)..



Figure A2: *Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Alliances with Members variable from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. IGOs are coded as "broadly" part of an issue area if there is any mention of topics related to the issue in the IGO charter document or the description in the Yearbook of International Organizations, and "narrowly" part of an issue area if there is no mention of another issue. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	FDI	Lag DV	Exc NATO	CW	Defense Pacts	Alliance Count	Distance	Cox PH
Avg. Alliances	1.842^{***}	1.179^{***}	2.476^{***}	2.256^{***}	1.998^{***}	2.543^{***}	2.006^{***}	1.172^{***}
	(0.212)	(0.133)	(0.154)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.194)	(0.112)
Incoming FDI	-0.046^{*}							
	(0.025)							
Outgoing FDI	0.001							
	(0.008)							
Cold War * Avg. Alliances				-0.305^{**}				
				(0.133)				
Alliance Count						-0.016^{**}		
						(0.007)		
Avg Distance							$-4.197\text{e-}5^{*}$	
							(2.207e-5)	
Trade w/ Members	0.579^{***}	0.156^{***}	0.332^{***}	0.358^{***}	0.362^{***}	0.343^{***}	0.350^{***}	0.159^{***}
	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Polity	0.023^{***}	0.029^{**}	0.019^{***}	0.012^{*}	0.010^{*}	0.009	0.015^{**}	0.024^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Cold War	−0.007	-0.399^{**}	-0.106^{**}	−0.004	-0.078^{**}	−0.049	−0.045	-0.346^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.100)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.365)	(0.038)	(0.102)
Observations	597,742	1,157,356	993,705	1,176,079	1,176,079	1,176,079	1,176,079	882,898
# IGOs	238	252	252	252	252	252	252	189
# States	143	156	131	157	157	157	157	120

Table A1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models*. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include the following controls (not shown): *GDP*, *GDP per capita*, *Trade Openness*, *Universal IGO*, *Regional IGO*, *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Full	Entry	Formation	Expansion	Exit	State-IGO FE	Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.052^{***}	1.298^{***}	1.692^{***}	1.243^{***}	-0.011	2.571^{***}	0.302^{***}
	(0.196)	(0.305)	(0.166)	(0.383)	(0.315)	(0.420)	(0.025)
Trade with Members	0.358^{***}	0.261^{***}	0.206^{***}	0.313^{***}	-0.048^{*}	0.067^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.058)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.001)
Polity	0.012^{**}	0.015	0.016^{***}	0.014	-0.006	0.065^{***}	0.002^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.0004)
GDP	0.054	0.040	-0.164^{***}	0.029	0.020	0.413^{***}	0.018^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.031)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.113)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	-0.211^{***}	-0.018	-0.054^{**}	-0.029	-0.156^{**}	-0.410^{***}	-0.004
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.003)
Trade Openness	-0.022^{***}	-0.055^{**}	-0.111^{**}	-0.063^{**}	-0.014	0.002	-0.0002^{*}
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.0001)
Universal IGO	0.151^{**}	1.103^{***}	-0.197^{**}	1.274^{***}	-0.194		0.030^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.126)		(0.007)
Regional IGO	-1.210^{***}	-2.095^{***}	-2.470^{***}	-2.205^{***}	-1.797^{***}		-0.051^{***}
	(0.113)	(0.160)	(0.129)	(0.207)	(0.686)		(0.007)
Cold War	-0.065^{*}	-0.217^{***}	-0.042	-0.168^{**}	-1.147^{***}	-0.271^{**}	
	(0.038)	(0.013)	(0.107)	(0.070)	(0.296)	(0.107)	
Observations	1,135,417	855,836	18,097	1,117,320	282,542	873,927	1,135,417
# IGOs	244	244	196	244	242	244	244
# States	157	157	155	156	157	157	157

Table A2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership*. Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in economic IGOs. The sample excludes IGOs which the COW alliance dataset codes as constituting an alliance. The following controls are included (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members*, *Members from Region*, *State-IGO Same Region*, *IGO Membership Size*, *Total State Memberships*, *Former Colony*, *Common Colonial History*, and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.



Figure A3: *Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the frequency with which observations in our sample of state membership in salient, economic IGOs are sorted into the geopolitical model. In the finite mixture model, each state-IGO-year observation is assigned a weighted mixture of the economic and geopolitical models. A value of one on the x-axis indicates an observation is wholly generated by the geopolitical model. The figure reveals two clusters of observations: one group that is primarily consistent with the geopolitical model (around .7 on the x-axis) and one group that is more consistent with the economic model (around .3).



Figure A4: *Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Russia's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The collapse of the USSR in 1991 is reflected in the figure as a sharp reduction in the share of observations attributed to geopolitics.



Figure A5: *Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Iran's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). In the figure, the period of alliance ties with the United States during the fifties and sixties appears in the form of more geopolitical decisions on membership, and the break of relations with the United States in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution corresponds to a lower level of geopolitical motivation as alliances are less important for Iranian membership patterns.



Figure A6: *China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of China's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). China's outward turn and attempt to restore diplomatic ties in the 1970s is reflected as a decrease in the share of observations attributed to the geopolitical model.



Figure A7: *United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the United States's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). The United States has a low propensity to join IGOs based on geopolitics than other countries, according to the mixture model. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded.



Figure A8: *Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the Japan's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2). Japan is among the least geopolitical in its determination of membership decisions, which conforms to the post-war choices to privilege economic growth and rely on its steady alliance with the United States. Exclusion as a former enemy politicized some of its entry decisions in the 1950s, but the Japanese government sought to renew ties with a world that had been broken during the war; it applied to join any organization possible as part of this strategy to restore its position within international society. Then, the end of the Cold War increased uncertainty for Japan both in relation to the United States and the rising power of China. Japan began to pay more attention to geopolitics in its foreign aid policies in the 1990s, reflected as a slight uptick in proportion of IGO membership decisions that reflect a geopolitical logic.

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Alliance with Lead State	1.445^{***}		1.019^{***}
	(0.090)		(0.101)
Trade with Lead State		0.446^{***}	0.084^{**}
		(0.018)	(0.012)
Polity	-0.022^{*}	0.013	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)
GDP	0.241^{***}	0.140^{***}	0.217^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)
GDP per capita	-0.037	-0.430^{***}	-0.117^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.045)
Trade Openness	0.013^{*}	-0.195^{***}	-0.007^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Universal IGO	0.488^{***}	-0.032	0.175^{**}
	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.068)
Regional IGO	-1.889^{***}	-0.720^{***}	-1.231^{***}
	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.114)
Fatal MIDs with Members	8.205^{***}	23.720^{***}	11.289^{***}
	(1.752)	(2.826)	(3.197)
Existing Members from Region	0.114^{***}	0.866^{***}	0.183^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Cold War	-0.279^{***}	0.029	-0.053
	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.041)
Observations	914,934	211,151	1,126,085

Table A3: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2) with respect to the lead state of an IGO. Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

	1	0
Cold War	0.485	0.483
Universal IGO	0.616	0.467
Regional IGO	0.466	0.508
Democratic State	0.380	0.547

Table A4: *Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model*: The table shows the percent of observations assigned to the geopolitical model for a range of independent variables. Estimated assignment is from the finite mixture model described in Table 2.